Driving the Green: The Impact of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin on Disabled Athletes and the Future of Competitive Sports by Warden, Andrew I.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 80 | Number 2 Article 6
1-1-2002
Driving the Green: The Impact of PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin on Disabled Athletes and the Future of
Competitive Sports
Andrew I. Warden
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew I. Warden, Driving the Green: The Impact of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin on Disabled Athletes and the Future of Competitive Sports, 80
N.C. L. Rev. 643 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol80/iss2/6
Driving the Green: The Impact of PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
on Disabled Athletes and the Future of Competitive Sports
"We ought to take [the [J]ustices] all out and play golf.
They'd change their minds. I promise you, [walking is]
fundamental."'
-Jack Nicklaus
"I just don't think riding a cart makes a big difference. I




Casey Martin is a man chasing his dream? He simply wants to
become a great golfer on the Professional Golfers' Association Tour
1. Joan Biskupic & Harry Blauvelt, Ruling to Reach Beyond Golf, USA TODAY,
May 30,2001, at 1A (quoting Jack Nicklaus).
2. What People Are Saying, USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 2001, at 5C (quoting Phil
Mickelson).
3. Martin was raised in Oregon where he won the state high school golf
championship in 1989 and went on to win the Oregon State Amateur Golf Championship
in 1993. Marcia Chambers, Nike Has Its Money on Both Sides of Disability Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1998, at C5. Martin took his talents to Stanford University where he
teamed with current PGA Tour players Notah Begay and Tiger Woods to win the 1994
NCAA Golf Championship. Casey Martin Biographical Information, at
http:llwww.pgatour.comlplayerslbios/20445.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2001) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Martin, 29, turned professional in 1995 and earned his
first professional win on the Nike Tour (now called the Buy.con Tour), a minor league
tour one step below the PGA Tour, at the Lakeland Classic in January of 1998. Id. After
playing two years on the Nike Tour, Martin qualified for the 2000 PGA Tour by virtue of
finishing fourteenth on the Nike Tour money list. A Look Back at the Martin Case (May
29, 2001), at http:/lwww.pgatour.comlulce/featurelpgatour/0,1977,2106970,00.htmil (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). Unfortunately, Martin's initial season on the PGA
Tour was met with much less success. Although he ended the season as one of the leaders
in driving distance, Martin finished 179th on the money list and was unable to retain his
PGA Tour privileges. See PGA TOUR ENCYCLOPEDIA, Casey Martin's 2000 Stats, at
http:/lwww.pgatour.comlplayers/stats20445.html; Brian Campbell, On the Bubble... No
More (Nov. 11, 2000), at http:llwww.golfonline.com/news/golfweekl2000/november
pgatourqschoolllll.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Martin's 2001
season on the Buy.corn Tour has been equally frustrating as he has missed the cut in over
half the events he has entered. See Casey Martin, Player Profile, at
http:llsports.yahoo.comlpgalplayers/9/978 (last visited Nov. 27, 2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (showing Martin made the cut in only seven of sixteen
events).
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("PGA Tour").4 Martin certainly has the talent to tee it up with the
world's best, as evidenced by his previous achievements.5
Nevertheless, he has one characteristic that distinguishes him from
every other golfer on the PGA Tour: his disability.
Martin was born with Klippel-Tr6naunay-Weber Syndrome, a
rare circulatory disorder in his right leg that has rendered it half the
size of a normal leg.6 Because this condition limits his ability to walk
lengthy distances during a round of golf, Martin asked the PGA Tour
in 1997 to provide him with a golf cart so he could ride between shots
and holes.7 Due to PGA Tour rules mandating that all players walk
the course,8 the PGA Tour denied Martin's request. 9 Following this
decision, Martin brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act I° seeking a waiver of the PGA Tour's walking rule.11 The next
4. "I'd love to be known as a great golfer. Not as a guy in a cart or with a disability-
just a great golfer." Nick Charles & Don Sider, Fairway or No Way?, PEOPLE WKLY.,
Feb. 9, 1998, at 48, 48 (quoting Casey Martin).
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
6. Dave Kindred, Martin's on Par to Prove Himself, SPORTING NEWs, June 29, 1998,
at 63. Martin has Klippel-Trrnaunay-Weber Syndrome. Il The end result of this
condition is that blood gets trapped in the leg due to its inability to circulate back through
the body. Id This condition causes an erosion of the leg bone as well as chronic pain.
Charles & Sider, supra note 4, at 48. After caddying for Martin at the 2001 Richmond
Open, Sports Illustrated columnist Rick Reilly said the leg looked like "a baseball bat
somebody had used to hit a thousand rocks." Rick Reilly, On His Last Leg, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 4,2001, at 102, 102. Because the condition is progressive, the leg may
have to be amputated at some point in the future. Charles & Sider, supra note 4, at 48.
7. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (2001). Martin's first request
for a cart came when he was trying to gain entry onto the PGA Tour through its qualifying
school in 1997. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd 121 S. Ct.
1879 (2001). Martin was permitted to ride a cart during the first two stages, but had to
walk during the final round. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1886.
8. Martin, 121 S.Ct. at 1885.
9. Id. at 1886. While at Stanford, Martin successfully persuaded the Pacific 10
Conference and the National Collegiate Athletic Association to waive the requirement
that golfers walk and carry their own clubs. Id. at 1886-86.
10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)). After the PGA Tour denied Martin's
request for a cart, he obtained a preliminary injunction that allowed him to use a cart in all
PGA Tour and Nike (Buy.com) Tour events. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1886. Pending a final
resolution of the Martin case, the PGA Tour Policy Board, the rule making body of the
PGA Tour, stated that it would abide by all judicial rulings that apply to Casey Martin, but
it would not waive the rule for any other golfer. Statement from PGA Tour, at
http:lwww.pgatour.com/ulee/multipgatour/0,1927,2145540,00.html (May 29, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). In contrast, officials on the Australian PGA Tour
recently granted a request to allow a disabled golfer to use a cart. Lane Becomes First
Cart Using Australian, GOLF TODAY (FEB. 29, 2000) at http://wvw.golftoday.co.uk/
newslyeartodate/newsOO/cartl.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Nigel
Lane, who suffers from a mysterious foot and back ailment, was given a cart prior to the
initiation of any legal action. Id.
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four years witnessed a rare national debate that attracted attention in
both the sports and news worlds.
12
This debate came to a partial resolution in May 2001 when the
United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in PGA Tour, Inc., v.
Martin.3 In Martin, the Court affirmed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision allowing Martin to use a
cart. 14 More specifically, a seven-member majority of the Court made
two critical holdings. First, the Court stated that the PGA Tour was
subject to the mandates of Title III of the ADA, and Martin was
within its protection. 5 Second, the Court stated that a cart would not
fundamentally alter the nature of competitive golf tournaments. 6
11. Martin, 121 S.Ct at 1885. Three sets of rules govern PGA Tour sanctioned
tournaments. First, the "Rules of Golf," written by the United States Golf Association
("USGA") and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club in Scotland, apply a general set of rules
that govern play for professionals as well as amateurs. Il at 1884. The "Rules of Golf"
do not specifically prohibit golfers from using carts during play. Id. at 1984-85. Second,
the "Conditions of Competition and Local Rules," also called the "hard card," apply
specific rules that govern all PGA Tour and Buy.com events. Id. at 1885. This set of rules
has posed the biggest obstacle for Martin as it states that all competitors shall walk the
course. Id. Third, "Notices to Competitors" govern the rules and conditions at individual
PGA Tour tournament venues. Id. For example, these rules may explain how to deal
with a particular hazard and may even permit golfers to use carts in order to speed up play
if a lengthy distance exists between holes. Id.
12. Casey Martin has been the subject of numerous opinionated pieces by sports
writers as well social commentators concerning whether he should be able to use a cart on
the PGA Tour. See, e.g., Ira Berkow, Sports of the Times; Fairness and Riding a Golf Cart,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, at § 8 (arguing that because the PGA Tour has enacted several
rule modifications in the past, the Tour should grant Martin a cart); John Leo, Duffers in
the Court; The Supremes Shouldn't Bend the Rules for a Disabled Golfer, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 11, 2001, at 16 (criticizing Martin because the Supreme Court should
not intrude into the rules of competitive sports); Scott Mills, Casey Martin Case Sets Bad
Precedent, BALT. SUN, Feb. 22, 1998, at 6F (criticizing the Martin decision); Terrance
Moore, Ruling Allowing Martin to Use Cart Disregards the Essence of Golf, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Feb. 13, 1998, at E3 (criticizing the Martin decision); Rick Reilly, Give Casey
Martin a Lift, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 9, 1998, at 140, 140 (supporting the position
that Casey Martin should be allowed to use a cart); George Will, Meddling in Games,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 3,2001, at 31A (criticizing the Martin decision).
In addition, this debate divided many of the players on the PGA Tour. Compare
Golfers Speak Out, USA TODAY, May 30, 2001, at 3C (quoting Steve Pate and Frank
Nobilo, current PGA Tour players, as stating that a cart provides Martin with an
advantage over other players who have to walk), with Golf a la Cart, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 15, 1997, at 33, 33 (quoting several PGA Tour players as saying they
support Martin's battle to obtain a cart), and Kindred, supra note 6, at 63 (quoting the late
Payne Stewart as stating that Casey Martin should be allowed to ride a cart).
13. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1879.
14. Id. at 1898.
15. Id. at 1890.
16. Id. at 1892-93, 1897. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined. Id. at 1898 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Although the Court's opinion ended Martin's specific case, it did not
resolve the larger controversy surrounding the integration of disabled
athletes into competitive athletics. What remains to be seen is
whether the dire predictions of the various "Chicken Littles" of the
sporting punditocracy will come to fruition.I" These critics have
opined that the "sky is falling" because Martin represents the end of
equality and uniformity in sports.19 They argue that the case was
never only about Casey Martin or even about golf. Instead, the case
was always about the next person who would want a cart or other
assistance device and the flood of litigation that would surely ensue
by amateur and professional athletes of all sports who desire a rule
modification.2 °
17. Prior to Martin, several courts confronted the issue of integrating disabled athletes
into competitive sports. Compare Schultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp
1222, 1225-26 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (granting a little league baseball player with cerebral palsy
the right to play in a younger age division despite the fact that he would otherwise be too
old to play), Johnson v. Fla. High Sch. Activities Ass'n, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 579, 587 (M.D.
Fla. 1995) (permitting a nineteen year-old deaf athlete to play football even though he
exceeded the eighteen year-old age limit for participation in high school athletics), vacated
as moot, 102 F.3d 1172, 1173 (11th Cir. 1997), and Anderson v. Little League Baseball,
Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 346 (D. Ariz. 1992) (granting a temporary restraining order to a
wheelchair-bound first base coach so he could continue to coach on the field), with
Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying a
learning disabled nineteen year-old baseball player's request for a waiver of a by-law
requiring all Missouri high school athletes to be under the age of nineteen), and Elitt v.
U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 225 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (rejecting a request by a youth
hockey player with Attention Deficit Disorder that his father be allowed to be on the ice
during competition).
18. JAMES FINN GARNER, POLITICALLY CORRECT BEDTIME STORIES 57-62 (1994).
The story of Chicken Little is a famous children's tale in which the title character is
unexpectedly struck on the head with an acorn. Id. at 57. In response, Chicken Little
proclaims that, "The sky is falling, the sky is falling." Id. The analogy to Martin, 121 S. Ct.
at 1879, is appropriate because many commentators incorrectly believe that the sky is
indeed falling now that Martin is established precedent. See infra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
19. Dave Kindred, Doomsday Is Not Nigh, SPORTING NEWS, June 11, 2001, at 62, 62
(quoting the Libertarian Party, "What's next? Federally mandated stilts so... midgets
can play professional basketball? Should Roger Clemens be ordered by the court to throw
slower fastballs to near-sighted hitters?"); Leo, supra note 12, at 16 (stating that the
decision opens up significant room for other courts to adjust the rules of sport to advance
their own ideas of social justice); Moore, supra note 12 (arguing that the rules of
professional sports should not be altered to fit an individual's particular needs); Will,
supra note 12, at 31A (stating that courts will be confronted with cases from various
athletes seeking alterations in the rules in order to accommodate different disadvantages).
20. E.g., David Broder, Decreeing the DH?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
June 3, 2001, at 31A ("I am scared to death of the precedent that may have been set [by
the Martin decision]."); Suzanne Fields, High Court Shanks One in Casey Martin Decision,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 2, 2001, at B7 (stating that "nearly everybody is worried about the
next guy (or gal) who will step up and apply for a golfer's cart or the lame racer who will
qualify for wheels"); Golfers Speak Out, USA TODAY, May 30, 2001, at 3C ("In Casey's
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Despite these creative doomsday theories,2 1 the Supreme Court
crafted an opinion that severely limits the possibility of wholesale
changes across the American sporting landscape. By focusing on
Martin's individual circumstances, the opinion provides qualified
disabled athletes with the opportunity to participate in competitive
sports while simultaneously minimizing the chance that the rules of
competitive athletics will transform into a collection of individualized
exceptions.
For example, the Martin decision might provide highly talented,
disabled golfers like Ford Olinger'2 the opportunity to play on one of
golf's grandest stages, the U.S. Open 3 Olinger suffers from a hip
condition that limits his ability to walk a golf course 4 In 1998,
Olinger applied to play in one of the U.S. Open's local qualifying
tournaments and requested a cart.25 Like the PGA Tour, the United
States Golf Association ("USGA") 6 has a set of established rules
particular case, there's no doubt about his disability. This is not about Casey Martin. It's
about the possibilities it opens up. The next person's disabilities-it might not be as
clear.") (quoting current PGA Tour player Hal Sutton); Leo, supra note 12 (stating that
"[w]e will now have a great rush of litigation followed by more sports rules being bent or
repealed").
21. See, e.g., Joe Queenan, Differently-Abled Athletes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1998, at
A18 (envisioning that baseball players may petition for golf carts in order to circle the
bases); Press Release, Libertarian Party, From Casey Martin in a Golf Cart to Basketball-
playing Midgits on Stilts (May 29, 2001), at http://www.lp.orglpress/
archive.php?function=viewofrecord=205 (hypothesizing "rowboats for would-be olympic
swimmers" and head-starts for sprinters as a result of the Martin decision).
22. Olinger, 33, works as a local golf club professional in Warsaw, Indiana. Golf Cart
Rulings: The Battle Isn't Over Yet, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 20,2000, at 40. Although
he has never qualified for the PGA Tour, Olinger has been a member of the Professional
Golfers' Association since 1988. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1001
(7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
23. Qualifying for the U.S. Open is a very demanding competition. See Olinger, 205
F.3d at 1002. The USGA holds local and sectional qualifying tournaments at various
courses around the country. Id. In an average year, over 7,000 players compete for the
chance to be one of the chosen hundred to actually play in the Open. Id.
24. Olinger suffers from a degenerative hip disorder known as bilateral avascular
necrosis. Golf Cart Rulings: The Battle Isn't Over Yet, supra note 22, at 40.
25. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1004.
26. The PGA Tour and the USGA are entirely separate entitles. See JOHN
FEINSTEIN, THE MAJORS: IN PURSUIT OF GOLF'S HOLY GRAIL 222 (1999). The PGA
Tour is a non-profit organization that runs the PGA Tour, the Buy.corn Tour, and the
Senior PGA Tour. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1884 (2001). In contrast,
the USGA is a non-profit association of clubs, courses, and individuals that works to
promote the best interests of golf. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1002. The USGA runs
tournaments each year in thirteen designated categories with the biggest being the U.S.
Open. Id. at 1002. Although professional players take part in events run by both
organizations, both the tournaments and organizations are autonomous from one another.
See FEINSTEIN, supra, at 222.
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that prohibit cart use in tournament play.27 After his request was
denied, Olinger filed suit against the USGA.
Although the Martin decision does not guarantee that Olinger
will be able to use a cart in USGA tournament play, 9 the Supreme
Court's opinion effectively corrected an erroneous decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Olinger's
case that neglected to consider any of his individual circumstances
and held that a cart fundamentally altered the nature of competitive
golf.30  In light of Martin, Olinger, and other similarly situated
athletes,3 will now have the opportunity to convince the courts that
27. USGA competitions are governed by the USGA's "Rules of Golf." Olinger, 205
F.3d at 1003. In addition to this book, the USGA has supplemental rules for tournaments
entitled "Local Rules and Conditions of Competition for USGA Championships." Id
Although no specific ban on carts exists within the "Rules of Golf," the supplement gives
tournament officials the discretionary power to prohibit carts. Id With respect to the
U.S. Open, the tournament entry form expressly states that "[p]layers shall walk at all
times during a stipulated round." Id.
28. Id. at 1004.
29. The Supreme Court's opinion in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin only applied to Casey
Martin because the Court focused on Martin's individual circumstances. See Martin, 121
S. Ct. at 1896-1898. Although the opinion obviously has the potential to provide other
athletes with athletic accommodations, such accommodations will only be necessary upon
an analysis of the athlete's individualized circumstances. See infra notes 238-42 and 251-
62 and accompanying text.
30. See Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005-07. The Seventh Circuit's opinion read more like an
homage to the virtues of golf than a consideration of Olinger's individual claim. Michael
Waterstone, Let's Be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA Will Not Ruin Professional Sports,
2000 BYU L. REv. 1489, 1529 (stating that the Seventh Circuit's opinion references
twenty-two professional golfers by name and recounts at least nine irrelevant stories from
golf's history). Rather than discuss the specifics of Olinger's disability as it related to his
requested relief, the Seventh Circuit largely relied on the anecdotal testimony of Ken
Venturi, a former PGA Tour player. See id. at 1518-19.
31. In addition to Olinger, a second golfer has also filed suit against the USGA
seeking to use a cart during tournament play. JaRo Jones, 54, suffers from post-polio
syndrome and petitioned the USGA for the right to ride a cart in the U.S Senior Open.
Michael Lutz, Texas Golfer Hopes Supreme Court Ruling Will Help His Dream (May 30,
2001), at http:llsports.yahoo.com/pga/news/ap/20010530/ap-disabledgolfer-jones.html (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas granted a preliminary
injunction in favor of Jones permitting him to use a cart during the 2000 qualifying rounds.
Id. The USGA appealed this decision and the case is currently pending before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Id In addition to Martin, Jones, and Olinger,
several other courts have addressed the ADA's relationship to golf. See, e.g., Dorsey v.
Am. Golf Corp., 98 F. Supp. 2d 812, 817 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (stating that the plaintiff made
sufficient allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss by claiming that a golf course failed
to provide specialized golf carts, handicap parking, handicap accessible facilities, and
handicap accessible tee boxes); Slaby v. Berkshire, 928 F. Supp. 613, 615 (D. Md. 1996)
(holding that a country club did not violate the ADA because its placement of ropes and
barriers only mildly inconvenienced disabled golfers attempting to play the course).
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their individual circumstances warrant modifications of the rules of
competitive athletics.32
Olinger's and Martin's individual circumstances illustrate why
the Supreme Court correctly decided the Martin case. Both Olinger
and Martin share a rare combination of physical affliction and athletic
talent. The Supreme Court correctly recognized that Martin
possesses these unique attributes and emphasized that future courts
should give individualized treatment to similarly situated athletes who
seek access to the world of competitive athletics.33 As a result of this
focus on the individual athlete, the Martin decision does not invite the
opening of the litigation floodgates.34 Instead, the Court's opinion
effectively advances disabled athletes in the fight to pursue their
athletic goals.
Additionally, the Supreme Court's focus on the individual
circumstances of the athlete balances the rules of competitive sports
and the desire for accommodation. Contrary to many critics' beliefs,35
Martin will not lead to shorter baskets in the NBA or armored suits in
the NFL .36 Rather, Martin simply requires an individual examination
of a person's circumstances with respect to his or her requested
modification.37  Because this analysis considers the requested
modification's impact on the game and other competitors,38 the
Supreme Court has appropriately limited the reach of Martin to those
rare instances when a rule modification would meet two criteria.
32. Like Martin, Olinger also petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 2212, 2212 (2001). The Court granted
Martin's request, but declined to rule on Olinger's request until Martin's case was decided.
Id. Following the announcement of the Martin decision, the Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded Olinger's case for additional consideration
in light of the Martin decision. Id.; see also Phil Richards, Hoosier Golfer Gets Break with
Supreme Court Ruling, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 5, 2001, at D1 ("My first impression is
'Great. We won .... But until I see it from the 7th Circuit Court, in handwriting, I can't
go anywhere.' ").
33. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896-98.
34. Since the Martin decision, only one person has requested to ride a golf cart during
competition. Lee Penterman, who walks with a limp because of a disease, asked the
USGA if he could use a cart while caddying for a friend in the U.S. Amateur Public Links
Championship. John DeShazier, It's the Attitude of the USGA That's Lame; Caddie's
Plight Latest Slap in Face, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 13, 2001, at D1.
The USGA denied this request on the grounds that the Martin decision only related to
players, not caddies or spectators. See icL
35. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
36. See supra notes 19 and 21 and accompanying text.
37. See Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897 (explaining that a basic requirement of the ADA is
an individualized need assessment of a disabled person).
38. See id. at 1893 (reasoning that some modifications are unreasonable even if they
affect all competitors equally).
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First, the modification must be absolutely necessary for a disabled
athlete to participate in the athletic competition.39  Second, the
modification can only have a peripheral impact on the sport and the
other participants n°
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin4' and assesses the decision's implications for
disabled athletes and the future of competitive sports. Part I of this
Comment focuses on the relevant portions of the American with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"), as they apply to disabled athletes.42 Part II
of this Comment addresses an issue that was not covered by the
Supreme Court in Martin: Who qualifies as an athlete with a
"disability" under the ADA?43 Part IV of this Comment critically
assesses the Supreme Court's decision in Martin, paying careful
attention to three key questions. First, are sports organizations
subject to Title III of the ADA?' Second, is an athlete's proposed
accommodation a reasonable and necessary modification in policy,
practice, or procedure?45 Third, would the proposed modification
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition or event?46 This
Comment concludes by summarizing Martin's likely impact on
disabled athletes and competitive athletics. 7
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: AN OVERVIEW
A. History and Background of the ADA
Before Martin's impact can be properly assessed, one needs an
understanding of the legal basis underlying the suit, the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). The ADA, enacted on July 26, 1990,
is the most expansive and ambitious law protecting disabled citizens. 8
39. See infra notes 201-10.
40. See infra notes 229-50.
41. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
42. See infra notes 48-109 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 110-49 and accompanying text. The Court did not have to reach
this issue because the PGA Tour did not contest the fact that Martin had a recognized
disability under the ADA. See Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1885-86.
44. See infra notes 150-84 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 185-213 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 213-62 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
48. Diane Heckman, Athletic Associations and Disabled Student Athletes in the 1990s,
143 EDUC. LAw REP. 1, 11 (2000). Although it represents the most comprehensive law
for the benefit of disabled citizens, the ADA was not the first law to assist disabled
individuals in their struggle against discrimination. See, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring that all children
[Vol. 80
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In passing the ADA, Congress sought to provide "a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."49  The ADA's
breadth derives in large part from its expansion upon ideas that were
originally developed in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.50
The close relationship between the ADA and the Rehabilitation
Act is important to the interpretation of the ADA 1 Both Congress
and the courts have recognized that the ADA should be construed to
provide at least as much protection to disabled citizens as the
Rehabilitation Act afforded.52 This recognition means that courts
should read the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in conjunction with one
another.53 For instance, the definition of the word "disability" within
with disabilities have a free public education with attention to their special needs); Design
and Construction of Public Buildings to Accommodate Physically Handicapped, 42 U.S.C
§§ 4151-4157 (1994) (mandating that buildings constructed or financed by the federal
government accommodate those with disabilities).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). Congress invoked a broad array of its powers in
passing the ADA, including the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
§ 12101(b)(4).
50. See The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, title V, § 504, 87 Stat. 394
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination
against disabled individuals who participate in programs that receive federal funds. See 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. V 1999). These "programs" include universities, state and local
government agencies, and corporations that receive federal money. Id. § 794(b). In
addition to the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA was also modeled, in some respects, after
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in specified places of
accommodation), with § 12182(a) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals
by places of public accommodation).
51. See, e.g., Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 845 n.6
(7th Cir. 1999) (stating that the standards applicable to the Rehabilitation Act also apply
to the ADA); Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that cases
construing one act are instructive in construing the other because the two statutes are
largely the same); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that cases involving claims under the Rehabilitation Act are instructive in
evaluating claims under the ADA).
52. § 12201(a) (stating that unless otherwise provided, nothing in the ADA should be
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standard of protection that applies to the
Rehabilitation Act); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1998) (noting that the
ADA provides at least as much protection as the regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ADA's coverage is more
expansive than the Rehabilitation Act. Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 939 F.
Supp. 584, 588 (N.D. Ohio 1996) ("The main difference between the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA is that the coverage of the ADA is broader, extending its [p]rohibition
against discrimination to private individuals, including private owners and operators of
places of public accommodation.").
53. Paul M. Anderson, Spoiling a Good Walk- Does the ADA Change the Rules of
Sport?, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 44, 47 (1999) (stating that the ADA should be read together
with the Rehabilitation Act).
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the meaning of the ADA is based upon the definition of "handicap"
in the Rehabilitation Act.' Therefore, the word "disability," when
used in conjunction with the ADA, should be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the case law and regulations governing the meaning of
"handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act.55
In addition to analogous statutes, courts must also construe the
ADA in light of its own legislative history. Most importantly, for
present purposes, nothing in the ADA's legislative history indicates
that Congress intended to exclude the ADA from the field of
competitive athletics. In fact, the only mention of sports during the
floor debates concerned the ADA's possible impact on drug testing
policies in major professional sports leagues 6 Although this silence
might yield numerous interpretations, the ADA only gives explicit
wholesale exclusions to two entities, private clubs and religious
institutions. 7 This provision supports the inference that Congress did
not intend to exclude competitive athletics from ADA coverage.58
Because courts have applied the ADA to competitive athletics
on numerous occasions,5 9 an analysis of the ADA's various provisions
is necessary for a full understanding of the statute's relationship to
athletics. The ADA features five main sections in addition to a brief,
yet significant, definitional provision. 0
54. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631 (holding that the similarity between the word
"disability" as used in the ADA and "handicapped" as used by the Rehabilitation Act
carries with it the implication that Congress intended the word "disability" to be construed
in accordance with pre-existing interpretations of "handicapped"); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc.
36 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that Congress intended that the case law
developed under the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "disability" be equally applicable
to the ADA). Although the Rehabilitation Act once contained the word "handicap," it
has since been amended and replaced by the word "disability." See Pub. L. No. 102-569,
§ 102(p) (32), 106 Stat. 4360 (1992) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994)).
55. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631; see also Collings, 63 F.3d at 832 n.3 (stating that the
legislative history of the ADA points toward the conclusion that Congress intended
judicial interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when
interpreting the ADA).
56. H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,363-64; see also 136
Cong. Rec. S9692 (daily ed. July 13,1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
57. § 12187 (exempting private clubs and religious organizations from ADA
coverage).
58. Another possible inference from this silence is that Congress never considered
applying the ADA to athletics. This inference is largely undercut by the fact that Title III
of the ADA specifically addresses a number of recreational and sporting venues. Id.
§ 12181(7)(L) (stating that a public accommodation includes "a gymnasium, health spa,
bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation").
59. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
60. See § 12102 (definitions); §§ 12111-12117 (Title I); §§ 12131-12165 (Title II);
§§ 12181-12189 (Title III); 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Title IV); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213
(Title V). Titles IV and V have little impact on disabled athletes, therefore they do not
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B. Definition Section of the ADA
The ADA's first section delineates who can receive protection as
a "disabled" individual.61 This section specifically states that a person
can only qualify as having a "disability" if possessed with one of the
following: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities; (2) "a record of such an
impairment;" or (3) "being regarded as having such an impairment."'62
Despite their brevity, these three broad statements have invited
copious interpretation, especially concerning what constitutes a
"major life activity" and a "physical and mental impairment."'
With respect to the first definition of "disability," determining
whether a person has a "physical or mental impairment" for purposes
of the ADA is a relatively straightforward task. This clarity is largely
due to the detailed and comprehensive definition put forth by the
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ").64  Nevertheless,
determining which ailments falling outside the DOJ regulations
merit significant discussion. In short, Title IV applies the provisions of the ADA to the
Federal Communications Commission. See 47 U.S.C. § 225. Title V contains a variety of
miscellaneous provisions, most importantly for this analysis, stating that the ADA
provides at least as much protection as the Rehabilitation Act. See supra notes 48-52 and
accompanying text.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
62. Id. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). With respect to the first category, the Supreme Court has
adopted a three question test to determine whether an individual is disabled under the
ADA: (1) is the individual physically or mentally impaired?; (2) is a major life activity
implicated?; and (3) does the impairment substantially limit the major life activity?
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
63. See infra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
64. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and
in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (2000). A "physical or mental
impairment" is:
(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and
lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such
as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities; (iii) The phrase physical or mental impairment
includes, but is not limited to, such contagious and noncontagious disease and
conditions as orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, FIV disease
(whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and
alcoholism; (iv) The phrase physical or mental impairment does not include
homosexuality or bisexuality.
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constitute a "physical or mental impairment" for purposes of the
ADA has sparked substantial litigation.65
Similarly, the question of whether an individual's disability limits
a "major life activity" has also proven difficult to answer in certain
circumstances, as evidenced by the significant amount of litigation
surrounding the topic.66 Before much of this litigation began, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a regulation
attempting to clarify the meaning of "a substantial limitation of a
major life activity."'67 Although the case law and administrative
provisions give some guidelines for analyzing what constitutes a
limitation on a major life activity, the broad language in these
definitions still promotes a wide array of interpretations. 68
65. See, e.g., Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281,286 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
obesity unrelated to a physiological disorder is not a physical impairment under the
ADA); Paleologos v. Rehab Consultants, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1460,1464-66 (N.D. Ga. 1998)
(holding that stress and depression disorders may or may not be disabilities under the
ADA depending on the circumstances surrounding individual cases); Fenton v. Pritchard
Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1443-46 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that a person with a low anger
threshold who had the potential to "go postal" was not disabled under the ADA).
66. Numerous cases, within a variety of contexts, have dealt with the issue of what
constitutes a limitation on a major life activity. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
638-42 (1998) (discussing whether reproduction is a major life activity and also whether
HIV places a limitation on this activity); Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130,
1132-34 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing whether a nuclear engineer suffering from depression
was limited in a major life activity due to the fact that her illness prevented her from
contributing to nuclear related projects); Langford v. County of Cook, 965 F. Supp. 1091,
1095-96 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (analyzing whether a person suffering from a stress related
disorder such that the person cannot work for a specific job supervisor constitutes a
limitation of a major life activity).
67. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)-U) (2000). The regulation defines
"substantially limits" as being unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform, or being significantly restricted in
performing a particular major life activity as compared to an average person who can
perform the same activity. Id. § 1630.2(j)(62)(i)-(ii). This regulation also lists three
factors that should be taken into account when analyzing whether or not a person is
substantially limited in a major life activity: (1) the severity of the impairment; (2) the
duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long term impact resulting from the
impairment. Id. § 1630.20)(1)(i)-(iii). For example, caring for one's self, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working all constitute major life activities.
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving Federal
Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2000).
68. Compare Bingham v. Or. Sch. Activities Ass'n, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (D. Or.
1988) (finding that a high school student diagnosed with attention deficit disorder was
disabled under the ADA), with Price v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 966 F. Supp. 419, 427-
28 (S.D. W.Va. 1997) (holding that medical students with attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder were not disabled under the ADA).
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The second definition of "disability" covers individuals with "a
record of such an impairment."6 9 This category primarily applies to
individuals who have a record concerning some type of disability in
the past, yet show no discernable signs or complications of the
disability at the time they seek certification as "disabled" individuals
under the ADA.70
Finally, the last group of individuals covered by the definition of
"disability" are people who are generally "regarded as having such an
impairment. ' 71 This provision primarily assists two classes of people.
First, it protects individuals who are mistakenly thought to have a
limiting impairment, even though such a disability does not in fact
exist.72  Second, it shields those citizens who in fact have an
impairment, but are incorrectly classified as being limited in a major
life activity because of the impairment.73 The key point with respect
to the "regarded as" group is that the entity subject to the ADA must
69. 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(B) (1994). The phrase "such an impairment" refers back to
the first definition of "disability" listed in § 12102(2)(A). Namely, a "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities." Id.
§ 12102(2)(A).
70. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 280-81 (1987) (stating that
the plaintiff had a "record of such impairment" after a hospital stay for tuberculosis even
though the plaintiff's employment termination occurred more than twenty years after the
hospitalization); Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1382 (3d Cir. 1991) ("A
person with a record of impairment can still qualify as a handicapped individual [under the
Rehabilitation Act] even if that individual's impairment does not presently limit one or
more of that person's major life activities."); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (2000) (defining a
record of such impairment as a history or misclassification of a mental or physical
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
72. Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that in order
to bring a claim under the "regarded as" category, a plaintiff must allege that the
discriminating party believed, however erroneously, that the plaintiff suffered from an
impairment that, if it truly existed, would be covered under the ADA); see Johnson v. Am.
Chamber of Commerce Publishers, Inc., 108 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that an
employer may regard an employee as disabled under the ADA if the employer misreads a
medical report and imputes the employee with a heart condition that the employee never
even had); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 912-15 (11th Cir. 1997)
(analyzing whether an employee who received cancer treatment was "regarded as having
such an impairment" due to the fact that an employer gave the individual different job
responsibilities following his return to work).
73. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489-94 (1999) (discussing
whether an individual with poor eyesight could be classified as disabled under the ADA
when the individual's employer mistakenly thought the impairment limited a major life
activity); Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516,519-23 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a female with a thyroid disorder was properly regarded as having a disability under
the ADA because evidence illustrated that her employer modified her job responsibilities
because of her medical condition even though her condition was properly controlled by
medication).
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misperceive the individual's disability; it must either erroneously
believe that the person has a limiting impairment or a substantially
limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment does not limit a
major life activity.74
Once a plaintiff in an ADA action establishes a recognized
disability under the ADA, plaintiff's suit may proceed under any one
of three different Titles.' The remaining portion of Part I will detail
each of these three Titles as they relate to disabled athletes.
C. Title I
Title I of the ADA protects disabled individuals against
discrimination in an employment setting.76 This provision generally
applies to any employer who engages in a commercial enterprise and
utilizes fifteen or more employees for a duration of at least twenty
weeks. 7
In order to hold an employer liable for discrimination under Title
I, an individual must first prove that he is disabled for purposes of the
ADA.78 Next, the individual must establish that he can perform all of
the "essential functions" of the job, 9 with or without a reasonable
74. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
75. In any ADA action, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a recognized
disability under the ADA. This showing must be made to the trial court as part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case. See, e.g., Weigert v. Georgetown University, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1,
6-7 (D.D.C. 2000). Quite obviously, if the plaintiff does not have a disability for purposes
of the ADA, the plaintiff cannot seek relief under the statute. See, e.g., Christian v. St.
Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). Title I protects disabled citizens in all phases of
the employment process, including job application procedures, hiring, advancement,
discharge, compensation, training, as well all as other terms and conditions of
employment. Id
77. See id. § 12111(5)(A). This provision has been referred to as the "mom-and-pop
grocery store" exception because it generally excludes small businesses with less than
fifteen employees from the mandates of the ADA. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct.
1879, 1899 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The ADA also excludes the United States, any
corporation owned by the United States, Indian tribes, and private membership clubs from
Title I coverage. § 12111(5)(B)(i)-(ii).
78. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
79. § 12111(8). An essential job function is generally a primary duty of the job that
does not include marginal functions. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1999); see
E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that when an
employee's job relates to the safety of other people, an essential function of the job is
demonstrating that he can perform those functions without endangering others). The
following factors may help determine whether a job function is essential: the employer's
judgment, written job descriptions, and the length of time spent performing the activity.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)-(iii).
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accommodation. 80 In any case, Title I clearly states that an employer
will not be required to make an accommodation for a disabled
employee if the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the employer's business.81
Within the field of athletics, a disabled athlete could certainly
utilize Title I to prevent discrimination in an appropriate employment
setting. In order to successfully raise a Title I claim, a disabled
athlete would first have to establish that he is an employee 2 and the
sports organization is his employer.83 For example, Title I could
arguably apply to professional athletes employed by a professional
sports franchise.84  A professional athlete, however, has yet to
successfully sue under Title I.' This lack of litigation results from the
80. Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1996).
The statute does not specifically define a "reasonable accommodation," however it lists
several things that may qualify as such: making facilities accessible to disabled employees,
modifying work schedules, and providing either readers or interpreters. § 12111(9)(A)-
(B). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has expanded this definition to
include "any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done
that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities." 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630 (1999).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). For purposes of Title I, any action that would require
the employer to incur significant difficulty or expense constitutes an undue hardship. Id.
§ 12111(10)(A); see Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 279-80 (11th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the Veterans Administration was not required to accommodate for the
absence of a disabled employee because finding another person at the last minute to do
the employee's work would place an undue burden upon the employer). Factors to
consider in determining whether an accommodation would present an undue hardship
include the cost of the accommodation, the effect the accommodation would have on the
employment facility, and the financial resources of the employer. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-
(iii).
82. Under the ADA, an "employee" is defined as "an individual employed by an
employer." § 12111(4).
83. An employer is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees for each working day of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person." Id.
§ 12111(5).
84. In addition to the professional sports setting, one commentator has suggested that
scholarship student athletes may be considered employees of the universities they attend.
See Anderson, supra note 53, at 49 & n.18. But see Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs.,
444 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 (Ind. 1983) (holding that a scholarship football player was not an
employee of Indiana State University for workers compensation purposes); Coleman v. W.
Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. App. 1983) (holding that a scholarship football
player was not an "employee" of his university for purposes of Michigan's Workers'
Disability Compensation Act).
85. Anderson, supra note 53, at 49. Casey Martin attempted to raise a Title I claim
during his motion for summary judgment at the trial level. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984
F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 1998); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (D.
Or. 1998). Martin argued that he was entitled to protection under Title I due to the fact
that he was an employee of the PGA Tour. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1323. After holding
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reality that only a select number of individuals possess both a physical
disability and the athletic talent to compete within the able-bodied
professional ranks.86 Nevertheless, many disabled athletes compete at
the amateur and scholastic level for their high schools and
universities. For these disabled athletes, Title II of the ADA
provides a more easily utilized basis for relief.
D. Title 11
Title II of the ADA applies to "public entities, any state or local
government agency or department."'  This provision prohibits public
entities from discriminating against disabled individuals or
prohibiting them from participating in the entities' services or
programs.ss As with Title I, a disabled individual must first be
considered a "qualified individual with a disability" under any one of
the three definitional categories.89 In addition, a successful Title II
plaintiff must prove: (1) that the public entity discriminated against
the individual in some fashion; and (2) that the discrimination was
based upon the individual's disability.9°
Courts have generally regarded state high school athletic
associations as public entities under Title II because public schools
have delegated significant authority to these athletic organizations.91
As a result of this state involvement, several disabled high school
the issue over for trial, the trial court quickly dismissed this contention without significant
discussion, incorporating by reference the argument contained in the PGA Tour's brief.
Martin, 994 F. Supp. at 1247 n.7. Although a major sports organization has yet to be held
as an employer under the ADA, the Professional Golfers' Association was held to be an
employer under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for purposes of a motion to dismiss. See
Naismith v. Prof'l Golfers' Ass'n, 85 F.R.D. 552, 560-61 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that a
female golfer and the Professional Golfers' Association had an employment relationship
for purposes of a motion to dismiss).
86. Title I's status as the only ADA section that provides for a jury trial and punitive
damages bolsters this inference. § 1981a(a)(2), (c). Presumably, a disabled athlete who
has valid claims under multiple provisions of the ADA would assert Title I as a first
priority because of the potential for a trial in front of a sympathetic jury and a large
financial judgment. The fact that no disabled athlete has raised a successful Title I case
indicates that qualified plaintiffs simply do not exist.
87. Id. § 12131(1).
88. Id. § 12132.
89. Id. § 12131(2). Under Title II, an individual must have a disability within the
meaning of the ADA. Id. Also, the person making the claim must be eligible to receive
benefits or participate in the public entity's programs either with or without a reasonable
modification in the rules or procedures governing the entity. Id.
90. Darian v. Univ. of Mass.-Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77, 84 (D. Mass. 1997).
91. Julia V. Kasperski, Comment, Disabled High School Athletes and the Right to
Participate: Are Age Waivers Reasonable Modifications Under the Rehabilitation Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 49 BAYLOR L. REv. 175, 183 (1997).
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athletes have sued their respective state high school athletic
associations under Title II of the ADA.' Title II would not apply to
a professional athlete like Casey Martin, however, unless the
discriminating actor could be classified as a "public entity." Because
many professional and amateur sports organizations are private
entities unaffiliated with state and local governments, most disabled
athletes must bring ADA claims under Title III.
E. Title III
Title III is the most important section of the ADA with respect
to disabled athletes seeking access to competitive sports. 4 Title III
protects disabled individuals against discrimination in places of public
accommodation.95 Specifically, Title III provides that "[n]o individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation96 by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
92. Many Title II claims brought by high school athletes have involved mentally
disabled student athletes seeking a waiver of an athletic association's age eligibility
requirement. The problem for these individuals is that their disabilities have forced them
to repeat a year of school, thus they reach their final year of high school one to two years
older than the rest of the student body. Disabled athletes in this position often confront
athletic association rules that prohibit students from competing in athletics if they are
either over the age of nineteen or have completed eight semesters of high school. For
examples of cases involving this situation, see Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 853-54 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's decision to
grant a waiver of Indiana's eight semester rule to a learning disabled high school
basketball player under Title II); Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d
926, 930-31 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a learning disabled baseball player was not a
"qualified individual with a disability" under Title II of the ADA); Dennin v. Conn.
Interscholastic Athletic Conference, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 671 (D. Conn. 1996) (granting
a preliminary injunction to a mentally retarded nineteen year old swimmer so he could
participate on his high school swim team), judgment vacated as moot, 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
1996).
93. §§ 12181-12189.
94. Both Martin and Olinger sued under Title III of the ADA. PGA Tour, Inc., v.
Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 (2001); Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001,
1004 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
95. See § 12182. For example, Title III protects against the imposition of
discriminatory eligibility criteria, the failure to remove structural barriers, and the general
exclusion and segregation of disabled individuals. Id § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v).
96. Title II of the Civil Rights Act was the first statutory provision to confer citizens
with protection against discrimination by public accommodations. § 2000a (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin in specified places of
public accommodation). Because both statutes, in addition to the Rehabilitation Act, use
the term "place of public accommodation," some courts confronted with claims from
disabled athletes have looked to cases interpreting these other statutes for guidance. See,
e.g., Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 118 F. Supp. 2d 494,512 n.12 (D.N.J. 2000)
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operates a place of public accommodation."97  Rather than
prescribing a specific definition of a "place of public
accommodation," Title III recites a list of twelve categories of
different entities covered by the ADA.9 With respect to athletics,
Title III applies to facilities like gymnasiums, health clubs, golf
courses, bowling alleys, and other places of recreation and exercise.9
Disabled athletes suing under the ADA because of
discrimination by an owner or operator of one of these entities most
frequently invoke 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) of Title III.' °
Before proceeding under this provision, however, a plaintiff must
satisfy two preliminary conditions. First, the plaintiff must establish a
disability within the meaning of the ADA.10 1 Second, the plaintiff
must prove that the entity that has allegedly engaged in the
discriminatory conduct owns or operates a place of public
accommodation. 1°2
(stating that courts have recognized the utility of interpreting similar Rehabilitation Act
language in ADA cases); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(noting that an analysis of Title II would be helpful in deciding the plaintiff's Title III
ADA claim).
97. § 12182(a).
98. Id. § 12181(7)(A)-(L). For instance, this list of public accommodations includes
hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, concert stadiums, retail stores, banks, museums, zoos,
and schools. Id. In an attempt to clarify what constitutes a public accommodation, the
U.S. Department of Justice has stated that the accommodation must be a facility operated
by a private entity whose activities impact commerce and fall within one of the twelve
protected categories listed in § 12181(7). See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability
by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1999); see
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12186(b) (2001) (stating that Congress expressly delegated authority to
the Department of Justice to issue regulations implementing Title III of the ADA).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
100. This section states that discrimination against a disabled individual is:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures,
when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless
the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations.
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
For examples of cases in which disabled athletes have brought actions under this
provision, see PGA Tour, Inc., v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1893 (2001); Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated and
remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001); Bowers v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 118 F. Supp.
2d 494, 518 (D.N.J. 2000); Schultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222,
1226-27 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
101. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
102. In short, the entity must own or operate a public accommodation that falls into
one of the twelve categories listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). See supra note 97-99 and
accompanying text. This issue was a crucial difference between the courts of appeals
decisions in Martin and Olinger. In Martin, the Ninth Circuit held that golf courses under
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After satisfying these two preliminary requirements, the plaintiff
must then demonstrate that the place of public accommodation has
failed to make a reasonable modification in either its policies or
procedures. 10 3 Additionally, the plaintiff must establish that such
alterations are necessary in order for the plaintiff to take advantage of
the services or benefits that the place of public accommodation
offers."° Once the plaintiff establishes these elements, the place of
public accommodation must make the requested alteration unless it
can prove that the plaintiff's modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of the accommodation.10 5 Indeed, the fundamentally
alter'06 provision was a major point of disagreement between the
courts of appeals in Martin and Olinger.1°7 The disagreement was
finally resolved by the Supreme Court.08
Although the Supreme Court was forced to address the
fundamentally alter issue, it did not have to resolve the threshold
issue of whether a plaintiff seeking relief is disabled for purposes of
the PGA Tour's control during tournaments are places of public accommodation. Martin
v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2000), affd 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). In
Olinger, the Seventh Circuit never affirmatively stated that the PGA Tour was operating a
place of public accommodation because it instead chose to resolve the case on the basis
that a golf cart fundamentally altered the nature of competition. Olinger, 205 F.3d at
1005-07. Although the Supreme Court reframed this issue, the Court eventually held that
both Martin and the PGA Tour were subject to the provisions of Title III. Martin, 121 S.
Ct. at 1890-93. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 136-64.
103. § 12182(2)(A)(ii). Deciding whether a modification is reasonable involves a
highly individualized inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1996); Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d
1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he determination of what constitutes reasonable
modification is a highly fact-specific, requiring a case-by-case inquiry."). Several factors to
consider in this analysis include the effectiveness of the modification in curbing the
disability and the cost of the modification to the operator of the public accommodation.
Staron, 51 F.3d at 356; see also Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052,
1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that reasonableness within the context of Title III is generally
satisfied if the requested accommodation is proven to be reasonable in the general sense).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
105. Id. Evidence that focuses on the circumstances surrounding the disabled
individual, and not evidence speaking to the general nature of the accommodation, is the
type that will satisfy the public accommodation's burden of proving a fundamental
alteration. Johnson, 116 F.3d at 1059.
106. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
107. Compare Martin, 204 F.3d at 999-1002 (holding that a golf cart does not
fundamentally alter the nature of competitive golf), with Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1005-07
(holding that a golf cart fundamentally alters the nature of competitive golf).
108. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1893-97 (2001) (holding that Martin's use of a golf cart does
not fundamentally alter the nature of competitive golf). For further discussion of this
issue, see Part III.C.
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the ADA.109 As Part III details, this question is frequently the most
difficult one for courts confronting ADA claims from disabled
athletes.
II. WHO QUALIFIES AS A DISABLED ATHLETE UNDER THE ADA?
As discussed previously, athletes suing under the ADA must
establish that they have a recognized "disability.""'  Although the
statute provides three ways in which a person can qualify as having a
"disability,""' disabled athletes frequently choose to invoke the
"limitation on a major life activity" portion of this definition."2  In
short, the athlete must prove the following: (1) a physical or mental
impairment; (2) that implicates a major life activity;113  and
(3) substantially limits a major life activity."4 For disabled athletes
seeking disability status under the ADA, the most controversial issues
surrounding this provision are whether participation in competitive
sports qualifies as a "major life activity" and whether the athlete's
disability limits this activity.
Courts considering the relationship between athletics and major
life activities have reached inconsistent results. One reason for the
dissimilar outcomes derives from uncertainty surrounding the
standard used to determine whether athletics constitute a major life
109. In Martin, the PGA Tour conceded that Casey Martin had a disability for
purposes of the ADA. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1885-86. Similarly, the USGA did not contest
the fact that Olinger had a disability under the ADA. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1001.
110. § 12102(2). See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
112. E.g., Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1885, 1885 n.7; Knapp v. Northwestern Univ. 101 F.3d
473, 479 (7th Cir. 1996); Pahulu v. Univ. of Kan., 897 F. Supp. 1387, 1390-91 (D. Kan.
1995).
113. The following is a list of recognized major life activities: caring for one's self,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Receiving Federal Financial
Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2000).
114. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998). See supra notes 64-68 and
accompanying text.
115. Compare Knapp, 101 F.3d at 479-82 (holding that a college basketball player with
a heart condition was not disabled under the ADA due to the fact that participation in
intercollegiate basketball was itself not a major life activity nor was it a substantial
limitation on the major life activity of learning), with Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1393-94
(finding that participation in intercollegiate football may be a component of the major life
activity of learning, but holding that the plaintiff was not disabled under the ADA because
barring the plaintiff from football would not substantially limit his learning opportunities
at the university), and Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 483,
489 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that participation in cross country and track for a learning
disabled high school athletes was integral to their education and thus a major life activity),
rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
DISABLED ATHLETES
activity. Some courts apply an objective test that focuses on the
nature of the athletic activity and the average person's participation
in that activity.116 In contrast, other courts take a more subjective
approach to this problem, confining the inquiry to whether athletics
constitute a major life activity with respect to the particular disabled
individual.
11 7
Although no explicit holding has resolved whether an objective
or subjective test should govern, the United States Supreme Court
gave the lower courts some guidance in a decision involving non-
athletes, Bragdon v. Abbott.18  In examining whether sexual
reproduction was a major life activity under the ADA, a five-justice
majority rejected the contention that a major life activity must
necessarily correspond to a major public activity.119 This holding
implies that the subjective test should govern. Because the Court
held that a major life activity does not need to be something that is of
a public, economic, or daily character, it follows that the activity need
not be something objectively popular either. 20 As applied to disabled
competitive athletes, the fact that the majority of the general public
does not engage in either collegiate or professional athletics should
have no bearing upon the disability inquiry. Instead, courts should
focus on the individual circumstances surrounding the athlete's
disability with an emphasis on the role athletics play in the life of the
particular athlete.1
21
116. E.g., Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480-82. The court reasoned that playing basketball at a
Big Ten university was not a major life activity in the general sense as it does not equate
with activities that all citizens engage in such as breathing, walking, and working. Id. at
480. Although basketball was a major part of Knapp's experience at Northwestern, the
court stated his overall educational experience would not necessarily be substantially
diminished because he would still be able to participate in all other academic and social
affairs. Id. at 481.
117. Sandison, 863 F. Supp. at 488-89. In this instance, the court focused its analysis on
the disabled individual's particular circumstances. Id. Specifically, the court pointed to the
fact that athletics had improved Sandison's academic and social skills, thus leading to the
conclusion that participation on the track team was central to the major life activity of
learning. Id. at 489.
118. 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (holding that an HIV infected female was disabled for
purposes of the ADA because her condition limited her ability to engage in the major life
activity of reproduction and child bearing).
119. Id. at 639.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 638-39 (noting that the use of the phrases "caring for one's self' and
"performing manual tasks" in 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (1999) stands in direct opposition
to the argument that a major life activity must have a widespread public character). In
addition, the statute's plain text supports this conclusion as the definition of the term
"disability" is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual" 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
2002]
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Even though the Supreme Court did not confront the major life
activity issue in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,"2 the Court's opinion lends
further credence to the conclusion that the subjective test should
govern. In Martin, the Court emphasized on several occasions that
inquiries under Title III of the ADA must focus on the specific
individual seeking relief.1' 3  Because the Court conducted an
individual analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding a
person's condition when confronted with a request for an
accommodation under Title III, it stands to reason that this subjective
individual inquiry should also govern threshold ADA questions, such
as whether the individual is substantially limited in a major life
activity. Accordingly, courts should consider the role athletics plays
in the individual plaintiff's life, not whether the sport occupies a
central position in the average person's life.124
In addition to the difference between the objective and
subjective tests, the fact that disabled athletes engage in various levels
of competition is another reason courts have reached inconsistent
results in their analyses of whether athletics constitute a major life
activity. For instance, at least one court has been unwilling to deem
participation in recreational athletics a major life activity;115 but
several courts have reached the opposite conclusion when confronted
with ADA claims from scholastic athletes at the high school and
122. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
123. Id. at 1896 (stating that the PGA Tour's refusal to consider Martin's personal
circumstances in deciding whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the
purpose and language of the ADA); see also Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555, 566 (1999) (finding that the ADA expressly mandates that the "disability" inquiry
must be made "with respect to an individual"); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (2000)
("The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on
the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that
impairment on the life of the individual.").
124. To this end, the analysis in Pahulu v. University of Kansas is instructive. 897 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995). The plaintiff attempted to play collegiate football with a spinal
cord injury but the university denied this request. Id. at 1388. Because the plaintiffs
injury did not limit the plaintiff's "walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working," the university argued that the plaintiff was not limited in a major life
activity. Id. at 1390-91 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1994)). Even though competitive
football does not constitute a major life activity for a majority of the public, the court
conducted an individual analysis and held that football was related to the major life
activity of learning because the plaintiff's grades had improved, he had met new friends,
and had learned the importance of teamwork. Idl at 1393. However, the court went on to
hold that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in this major life activity because he
had the opportunity to participate in a host of other educational activities. Id.
125. Scharff v. Frank, 791 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that the
plaintiff's inability to engage in recreational soccer and softball were not substantial
impairments on a major life activity).
2002] DISABLED ATHLETES
college level.126 In fact, courts have been increasingly receptive to the
argument that athletics is a major life activity at the college level, but
many still disagree as evidenced by the inconsistent results in Knapp
v. Northwestern University"27 and Sandison v. Michigan High School
Athletic Ass'n, Inc."8 In fact, the major life activity inquiry at the
university level becomes very complicated because athletics represent
a small component of an athlete's total college education. For
example, in Pahulu v. University of Kansas,"29 the court concluded
that the plaintiffs involvement in competitive football invoked the
major life activity of learning because football had improved the
plaintiff's grades and taught him teamwork skills.130 Nevertheless, the
court did not view the plaintiffs exclusion from football as a
substantial limitation on this major life activity because the plaintiff
had the chance to participate on the football team in a role other than
a player, and had the opportunity to explore a host of other
educational programs available at the university.'
3'
In contrast to recreational and collegiate athletics, professional
athletics offer a much different context for analysis of the major life
activity issue. A disabled professional athlete may be able to
establish a limitation in the major life activity of working because
athletic competition is likely to provide the athlete's principal source
126. Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1393 (holding that the plaintiff's involvement in college
football was related to the major life activity of learning); Sandison v. Michigan High Sch.
Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 483, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that participation in
cross country and track for a learning disabled high school athletes was integral to their
education and thus a major life activity), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir.
1995). Contra Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
college basketball player with a heart condition was not disabled under the ADA due to
the fact that participation in intercollegiate basketball was itself not a major life activity,
nor was it a substantial limitation on the major life activity of learning).
127. 101 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a college basketball player with a
heart condition was not disabled under the ADA because participation in intercollegiate
basketball was itself not a major life activity, nor was it a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of learning).
128. 863 F. Supp. 483, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that participation in cross
country and track for learning disabled high school athletes was integral to their education
and thus a major life activity), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995).
129. 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995).
130. Id. at 1393.
131. hL; see also Knapp, 101 F.3d at 480 (stating that the major life activity of learning
is not lessened by the fact that a student does not play major college basketball).
Although Pahulu addressed this issue within a university setting, the same analysis would
presumably apply to a high school athletic setting. For example, a court applying the
Pahulu reasoning to the facts of Sandison would likely hold that the plaintiff's
involvement in high school athletics is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity
of learning because the student could engage in a number of other school sponsored
learning opportunities outside of athletics.
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of income.132 The Supreme Court, however, limited the breadth of
the major life activity of working in a recent decision. In Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc.,133 the Court considered an ADA challenge from
two pilots with poor eyesight who applied for positions with a
commercial airline.M The Court held that although the pilots could
not occupy positions as global airline pilots with a major commercial
carrier, they could still find work as regional pilots or pilot instructors.
As a result, the Court concluded that the pilots were not
"'substantially limited in the major life activity of working.' ,,13"
The Sutton decision presents a potential stumbling block for
professional athletes seeking to establish that they are substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. The Court's holding
suggests that disabled athletes must be prevented from holding a
broad class of jobs, not simply the specialized job they prefer.13 6 For
example, even though a disabled athlete may be prevented from
playing in one of the major professional leagues, the athlete's
disability may not prevent him from earning a living as a coach or
local professional. Major professional athletics is a highly specialized
job akin to the position of commercial airline pilot. Accordingly, an
athlete seeking disability status because of a substantial limitation on
the major life activity of working must be prepared to show that the
condition limits a broad range of athletic professions beyond simply
high profile competitive sports.
Notwithstanding Sutton's restrictions on the major life activity of
working, disabled athletes also have the potential to establish that
they are substantially limited in several other major life activities,
namely "walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, and
learning."''11 Because both Casey Martin and Ford Olinger have
limited ability to walk,138 neither the PGA Tour nor the USGA
contested the major life activity issue.1 39  Nevertheless, disabled
132. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2000) (stating that
working qualifies as a major life activity for purposes of the ADA).
133. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
134. Id. at 475-76.
135. Id. at 492-93 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt.1630, app. § 1630.2 (1998)).
136. See id.
137. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii).
138. Id. (explaining that walking qualifies as a major life activity for purposes of the
ADA).
139. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1885-86 (2001); Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, judgment vacated and
remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001). Had Olinger not been limited in his ability to walk,
Sutton likely would have prohibited him from bringing his claim on the basis of a
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athletes with less serious physical conditions could face significant
obstacles in the major life activity analysis. 14°
substantial limitation on the major life activity of working. For example, Olinger's
participation in U.S. Open qualifying does not implicate the major life activity of working
because it is only a single event and is unlikely to generate any significant income in
Olinger's favor. In fact, playing in the qualifying stage of the U.S. Open takes on more of
a recreational quality as participants must pay entry fees to play and face long odds of
even making the final field. Olinger, 205 F.3d at 1002-03. Because Olinger is a member of
the Professional Golfers' Association and derives his primary living from playing and
teaching golf at a 'local club in Indiana, Sutton's reasoning mandates that he is not
substantially limited in a broad class of sports-related work opportunities. Id. at 1001; see
Golf Cart Rulings: The Battle Isn't Over Yet, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 20,2000, at 40,
40.
140. Disabled athletes may confront problems due to the Supreme Court's holding that
corrective and mitigating measures must be considered when determining whether an
individual is substantially limited in a major life activity and thus disabled under the ADA.
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83. For example, disabled athletes may have a disability in name,
but not in actuality because of mitigating measures like artificial aids and pharmaceutical
products. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555,565-66 (1999).
In Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, a unanimous decision issued in
January 2002, the Supreme Court further clarified the meaning of a substantial limitation
on a major life activity. 2002 WL 15402, at *1. The Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred
in holding that a female factory worker with documented carpel tunnel syndrome was
disabled under the ADA. Id. at 12. According to the Court, submitting documented
medical evidence of an injury or ailment is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the
ADA. It. at 10. Although the plaintiff clearly had a history of carpal tunnel syndrome,
she did not have a substantial limitation on the major life activity of manual tasks because
her ailment did not prevent her from performing "a variety of tasks central to most
people's daily lives." Id. at 11. Although the plaintiff's injury clearly limited the number
of manual tasks she could accomplish inside the factory, her disability did not limit her in a
broad range of everyday activities, such as "household chores, bathing, and brushing one's
teeth." I. at 12. In the end, the Court found no support in the text of the ADA, its
previous opinions, or the regulations for the "idea that the question of whether an
impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered only by analyzing the effect of the
impairment in the workplace." I. at 11.
With respect to disabled athletes, Williams, like Sutton, has the potential to be a
significant obstacle in the effort to establish a substantial limitation on a major life activity.
After Williams, disabled professional athletes seeking to establish a substantial limitation
on the major life activity of working will need to establish that their ailments prevent them
from performing a broad range of tasks "central to most people's daily lives." I.L at 12.
Instead of simply pointing to the fact that the disability limits their performance on the
plaing field, Williams will likely mandate that disabled athletes prove that their disability
impacts rudimentary daily tasks as well. See idL Absent proof that the effects of the
athlete's disability crosses over into the tasks of daily life, a disabled professional athlete
seeking to establish a limitation on the major life activity of working will likely be denied
relief under Williams.
Nevertheless, Williams does not have such a limiting effect on disabled athletes
seeking to establish a limitation on one of the physical major life activities such as walking,
breathing, seeing, and hearing because limitations on these activities presumably have
similar impacts both on and off the playing field. For example, Casey Martin is
substantially limited in the activity of walking whether he is walking on a golf course or
walking down his driveway to get the mail, arguably a task central to most people's daily
lives.
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Indeed, the Martin decision will not lead to a flood of rule
modifications because many disabled professional athletes will have a
difficult time establishing a substantial limitation on a major life
activity. First, disabled professional athletes seeking to prove a
limitation on the major life activity of working will need to show more
than an omission from the top tier of athletics.14' Because of the
holding in Sutton, such a limitation will only exist if their condition
prohibits them from working in a broad range of sports-related
professions. Proving such a limitation would pose difficulty because
presumably any athlete qualified to play competitive professional
sports would also be able to earn a living as a coach or private
instructor.
Second, although many recreational and professional athletes
have the potential to establish a substantial limitation on one of the
major physical life activities,' 43 the requirement that these injuries be
of a significant duration and degree reduces the number of likely
plaintiffs. The cases interpreting the major life activity issue have
uniformly stated that temporary and nonpermanent conditions are
not disabilities under the ADA. 44 In fact, several courts have been
particularly strict with respect to finding that a physical injury
amounts to a substantial limitation on one's ability to walk. 145 These
holdings indicate that plaintiffs with temporary physical injuries like
sprained ankles and torn knee ligaments are not limited in a major
life activity.146 Furthermore, even plaintiffs with more chronic injuries
141. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
143. The physical major life activities include "walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, [and]
breathing." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2000).
144. E.g., Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 843-44 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiff with a temporary kidney ailment was not disabled for purposes of the ADA);
Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a temporary walking
impairment is not a recognized disability under the ADA); Blanton v. Winston Printing
Co., 868 F. Supp. 804, 806-08 (M.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that a plaintiff with a temporary
knee injury was not disabled under the ADA).
145. E.g., Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 415-17 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a plaintiff who limps and has pain everyday was not limited in the major life activity
of walking); Penchishen v. Stroh Brewery Co., 932 F. Supp. 671, 674-75 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding that a plaintiff who could walk at one-half her normal speed following an
automobile accident was not substantially limited in the major life activity of walking),
affd, 116 F.3d 469 (3d Cir. 1997).
146. Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a temporary ankle injury is not a disability under the ADA). According to the
ADA's Regulations, "temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or
no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. Such impairments may
include, but are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis,
and influenza." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630-20).
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not severely inhibiting major physical activities are unlikely to
establish a recognized disability under the ADA.14 7
The combined effect of these cases illustrates that athletes will
only qualify as having a disability under the ADA if they can establish
a significantly limiting permanent physical characteristic. Casey
Martin and Ford Olinger fit this criterion because they have serious
physical impairments; however, they represent a small class of
exceptional individuals who, in addition to their significant
disabilities, simultaneously possess the athletic skill to warrant
admission to the elite professional leagues. Because this combination
of severe physical impairment and world class athletic talent will only
be seen in a small number of people, the fact that Casey Martin
obtained his requested accommodation will not lead to an avalanche
of litigation in which every professional athlete with a bad back will
attempt to modify the rules of major competitive sports.
For the small number of disabled athletes capable of establishing
a recognized disability, the next step is to ensure that the mandates of
the ADA apply to the sports organization implicated by the plaintiff's
suit. As discussed earlier, this issue is easily determined in actions
brought under Title I and Title II of the ADA.148 Nonetheless, the
question of whether Title III applies to the owner or operator of a
public accommodation hosting a competitive sporting event was not
resolved until PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.49
III. DISABLED ATHLETES AND TITLE III OF THE ADA
A. Are Athletic Organizations Subject to Title III of the ADA?
Title III of the ADA protects disabled individuals from
discrimination in places of public accommodation.1 50  As stated
earlier, the ADA does not specifically define the term "place of
147. E.g., Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff
with post-traumatic degenerative joint disease of the right hip that caused him to move
slowly up stairs did not amount to a disability); Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1388-89
(4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a woman who developed "tennis elbow" after a car accident
was not handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act).
148. See supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text. In order to bring a claim against a
defendant under Title I, the defendant must be an employer as defined by 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A). Plaintiffs may only pursue claims under Title II against a "public entity."
42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (1994).
149. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
150. § 12182(a).
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public accommodation." ' Instead, Congress lists various private
entities that it considers places of public accommodation. 15 2
This list has presented problems for disabled athletes suing under
Title Ill because these athletes frequently bring complaints against
athletic membership organizations that are not themselves places of
public accommodation.153 Nonetheless, courts have held membership
organizations accountable under Title III if they exercise sufficient
control over the recreational or exercise facility deemed to be a place
of public accommodation."M Even though a sports organization may
not be a place of public accommodation, it may be subject to Title III
if it exercises sufficient control over facilities qualifying as places of
public accommodation.1 55
Under this rationale, sports organizations like the PGA Tour and
the USGA would be subject to Title III because they lease and
control the golf courses where they conduct their tournaments.156 In
order to circumvent this reasoning in Martin, however, the PGA Tour
presented three different arguments that ultimately proved
unpersuasive. First, upon a motion for summary judgment, the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon rejected the
PGA Tour's initial argument that it was a private club exempt from
Title III coverage altogether.157
151. See supra note 98-99 and accompanying text.
152. § 12181(7). See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
153. The case law has specifically held that membership organizations cannot be
considered places of accommodation under the ADA. Stoutenborough v. Nat'l Football
League, Inc. 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the National Football League
cannot be considered a place of public accommodation); Bowers v. NCAA, 118 F. Supp.
2d 494, 514 (D.N.J. 2000) (stating that the NCAA itself is not a public accommodation);
Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217,223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that a youth hockey
organization is not a place of public accommodation).
154. See, e.g., Bowers, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 516-17 (holding that the NCAA's regulation
of virtually all facets of collegiate athletic eligibility subject it to the provisions of the
ADA); Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114,1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (stating that the NCAA
is subject to Title III of the ADA because it exerts sufficient control over the athletic
facilities of its member schools); Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp.
1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that a youth baseball league was subject to Title III
even though it was not an actual physical structure). Contra Matthews v. NCAA, 79 F.
Supp. 2d 1199, 1205-06 (E.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that the NCAA is not subject to the
ADA because it does not operate a place of public accommodation).
155. For example, a youth baseball league would not be a place of public
accommodation. But the club could be subject to Title III if it owns or operates baseball
fields and other athletic venues that qualify as places of public accommodation. See
Shultz, 943 F. Supp. at 1225.
156. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1884 (2001).
157. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1323-26 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204
F.3d 994 (2000), afj'd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). The PGA Tour's argument was based on 42
U.S.C § 12187 (1994), which exempts private clubs and religious organizations from Title
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Second, both the district court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the PGA Tour's
"mixed-use" facility argument.158 The basic premise of the PGA
Tour's contention was that a golf course could be compartmentalized
into enclaves where only certain areas would be subject to the
provisions of Title III. s9 More specifically, the defendant predicated
this argument on the fact that the areas "outside the ropes," where
members of the public watched the golfers, was clearly a place of
public accommodation, but the actual course "inside the ropes,"
where the golfers played, was not an area protected by the ADA.16°
Although the Code of Federal Regulations 161 provides some support
for this mixed-use argument, the Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected this
position.162
III coverage. Id. at 1233. After analyzing seven different factors, the court ultimately
concluded that PGA Tour was not a bona fide private club. Martin, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-
26.
158. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. 204 F.3d 994, 997-99 (9th Cir. 2000); Martin, 984 F.
Supp. at 1326-27.
159. Martin, 204 F.3d at 997.
160. Id. The USGA also raised the "mixed-use" facility argument in Olinger. Olinger
v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, judgment
vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001). In addition to the "inside the ropes" versus
"outside the ropes" contention, the USGA also argued that a golf course could only be
classified as a place of public accommodation when either "exercise or recreation" is being
conducted on it. Id. at 1005. Because the U.S. Open is a tournament designed to identify
the best golfer in the United States for a particular year, the USGA argued that such a
competition cannot be deemed either recreation or exercise. Id Although the Seventh
Circuit seemed to accept the basic premise of this line of reasoning, it failed to render a
decision on the validity of this argument. Id. Instead, the court decided the case on the
ground that Olinger's use of a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of competition.
Id. at 1005-107.
161. 28 C.F.R, § 36, app. A at 623-25 (2000). An example of a mixed-use facility would
be a hotel with a residential wing attached to its guest wing. It- at 624. Under the ADA,
only the guest wing would be subject to the ADA. IL Similarly, a factory or movie studio
that allowed public tours would constitute a place of public accommodation only with
respect to the route followed by the tour participants. Id at 625. The areas viewed from
this route where actors make films, for instance, would not be considered places of public
accommodation. Id
162. Martin, 204 F.3d at 998-99. The court based its decision on three factors. First,
the court stated that the mixed-use reasoning only applied to commercial facilities that
were not considered to be places of public accommodation. Id. at 998. In contrast to
movie studios and factories, golf courses are specifically mentioned as being places of
public accommodation under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994). Second, the
court stated that this line of reasoning was unpersuasive because Casey Martin was not a
spectator attempting to use a golf cart inside an area reserved for tournament participants.
Martin, 204 F.3d at 998. Rather, Martin himself was a competitor who had qualified to
play on the PGA Tour and this status allowed him to access the area "inside the ropes"
unlike the average fan who is limited to the area "outside the ropes." Finally, an athletic
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Perhaps sensing the futility of raising the "mixed-use" argument
before the Supreme Court, the PGA Tour shifted the focus of its
ADA coverage argument once a writ of certiorari was granted. 16 3
Instead of trying to excuse itself from the mandates of the ADA, in its
third argument, the PGA Tour reframed the coverage issue, arguing
that Title III did not protect Casey Martin and other competing
golfers." More specifically, the PGA Tour contended that "clients
and customers" are the only people who can sue under Title III of the
ADA.165 Because Martin is a provider of the entertainment that the
PGA Tour sells to the public, he is neither a client nor a customer.
Accordingly, the PGA Tour argued that Martin could not seek relief
under Title III. 66
Notwithstanding the simplicity of this position, the Supreme
Court disagreed with the PGA Tour's assessment that Title III did
not protect Martin.67 Although the Court declined to state whether
Title III's protections are limited only to "clients or customers,"1" the
Court concluded that the PGA Tour's argument failed on its own
terms because golfers competing on the PGA Tour are clearly
"clients and customers. ' 169  The Court stated that PGA Tour
tournaments afforded members of the public two types of
"privileges, 170 watching the tournament as spectators and competing
organization's high degree of selectivity in who it allows to compete does not exempt it
from Title III. L-
163. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1890-91 (2001).
164. 1&
165. See iL at 1891. This argument is rooted in a section of Title III that states the
following: "For purposes of clauses (i) through (iii) of this subparagraph, the term
'individual or class of individuals' refers to the clients or customers of the covered public
accommodation that enters into the contractual, licensing or other arrangement."
§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). Clauses (i) through (iii) prevent operators of public
accommodations from denying a disabled "individual or class of individuals" an
opportunity to participate, receive equal benefits, or provide said individuals with separate
benefits. § 12182(b)(1)(i)-(iii). For a more comprehensive statement of the PGA Tour's
position, see Brief For Petitioner, Martin v. PGA Tour, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000) (No.
00-24), available at 2000 WL 1706732.
166. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1890-91.
167. Id at 1892-93.
168. Even though the Court did not squarely address this issue, it appeared hesitant to
adopt such a sweeping limitation of Title III coverage. The Court's skepticism can be
traced to the fact that the "clients and customers" language only modifies the three
provisions relating to participation and benefits, not to Title III's general prohibition
against discrimination by places of public accommodation. Id. at 1891.
169. 1& at 1891-92.
170. As discussed earlier, discrimination under Title III of the ADA is a "failure to
make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such
modifications are necessary to afford such ... privileges ... to individuals with
disabilities." § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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in the tournament as players .'7  Although playing in a tournament is
more difficult than simply buying a ticket to watch from the gallery,
the PGA Tour offers any citizen the chance to qualify for its
tournaments. 72 Given the broad purpose behind the ADA, the Court
held that it would be classic discrimination for the PGA Tour to
accommodate one set of "customers" (spectators) but not another
(players). 73
The Court's holding that Casey Martin has a viable Title III
claim against the PGA Tour signifies that other sports organizations
will likely be subject to ADA mandates as well. Most importantly,
the Court clarified the ADA coverage issue that remained uncertain
after the Ninth Circuit and Seventh Circuit reached conflicting
results. 74 Although the Court only addressed Martin's specific
relationship with the PGA Tour, the Court's tacit acknowledgement
that athletic organizations offer two types of Title III "privileges"
virtually guarantees that the ADA will apply to other sports entities.
Like the PGA Tour, most competitive sports organizations holding
their events at places of public accommodation offer citizens two
types of privileges-the privilege to observe the competition and the
privilege to play in the competition. 75 Obviously, the privilege of
playing in the NBA or on the PGA tour is much more difficult to
attain than simply playing in a local recreational league.
Nevertheless, the "privileges" offered by these two organizations are
identical, namely the chance to play in the game if certain baseline
171. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1892.
172. hL The PGA Tour conducts an open qualifying school every year to fill open
membership slots. Id. at 1884. Any member of the public can participate in this
tournament as long as he pays $3,000 and submits two letters of reference from other PGA
Tour or Nike Tour professionals. IL
173. See id. at 1892. The Court felt this holding was analogous to several similar cases
interpreting the public accommodation provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act. IL;
see Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1969) (stating that a "place of exhibition or
entertainment" protects "spectators and listeners" as well as those individuals
participating in "some sport or activity"); Wesley v. Savannah, 294 F. Supp. 698, 699-703
(S.D. Ga. 1969) (holding that a city golf tournament conducted at a public course violated
Title II of the Civil Rights Act by refusing to allow black residents to participate); Evans v.
Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474,477 (E.D. Va. 1966) (holding that Title II of the Civil
Rights Act "is not limited to spectators if the place of exhibition or entertainment provides
facilities for the public to participate in the entertainment").
174. In Martin, the Ninth Circuit held that the PGA Tour could be sued under Title III.
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). Conversely, the Seventh
Circuit declined to rule on this issue. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001,
1005 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
175. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1892.
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criteria are met.176 Because virtually all sports organizations offer
some degree of public privilege, either in the form of open
competition or tryouts, Martin ensures that athletic organizations
offering public competition at places of public accommodation will be
subject to the provisions of Title III.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia stated that one of the key lessons
sports organizations should learn from Martin is to end open
tryouts.77 On its face, Scalia's point is well taken, because the
majority based its holding in part on the PGA Tour's practice of
allowing members of the public to compete for a spot on the tour.178
Nevertheless, Scalia's "lesson" is indicative of the exclusionary
thinking that has plagued athletics for too long.179  If sports
organizations want to build walls around themselves and prevent
people from enjoying their amenities, then Justice Scalia is correct.
Open tryouts and public competitions will certainly end. However,
the reality of athletics in the twenty-first century is that talented
athletes like Casey Martin and Ford Olinger want to participate
alongside their able-bodied teammates and competitors. Inclusion,
whether by judicial fiat or voluntary consent, is the only way these
athletes can achieve their goals. Given this perspective, Scalia's
"lesson" is but an added chirp to the growing chorus of "Chicken
Littles" who see Martin as the end to competitive sports. When his
point is carried to its logical end, Scalia actually has it backwards-
open tryouts will most certainly continue. A sports organization
faced with the prospect of accommodating a disabled athlete will not
want to face another Martin scenario with protracted litigation
176. These baseline criteria will obviously differ depending on the skill level of the
particular league. In Martin, any member of the public with $3,000 and two letters of
recommendation could enter the PGA Tour's qualifying school. Id. at 1884. Conversely,
participation in a recreational sports league may only require a small entry fee.
177. Id. at 1905 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1892 (stating that the PGA Tour affords a public privilege to both spectators
and potential golfers). If the PGA Tour had not allowed members of the general public to
compete for an opportunity to play on the Tour, a major foundation of the majority's
opinion would have been removed.
179. See, e.g., Stanley Mosk, My Shot: The Tour's Fear of Carts Is the Same Form of
Bigotry That Caused the Caucasian-Only Clause, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (GOLF PLUS
SECTION), June 11, 2001, at G46, G46 (reporting a statement by California Supreme Court
Justice that the PGA Tour's Caucasian-only rule was not abolished until 1961). Given the
PGA Tour's history of exclusion, one commentator found it disheartening to see the PGA
Tour preach the gospel of inclusion with respect to Tiger Woods and minority golfers on
the one hand and fight off disabled golfers like Casey Martin with the other. Reilly, supra
note 12, at 140.
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possibly lasting for years.180 With Martin serving as an illustration of
what can happen when a sports entity resists accommodation, it
follows that accommodation up front, namely, continued inclusion via
open tryouts, presents the prudent course of action for sports
organizations."" Indeed, the vast majority of sports organizations are
not multi-million dollar professional entities like the PGA Tour, but
small voluntary associations formed at the local level.' 2 For these
smaller entities that are largely funded by voluntary contributions and
dues, it would be absurd to mortgage the organization's health by
litigating a potentially lengthy ADA challenge in order to exclude a
small number of disabled athletes.'l 3
180. Leo, supra note 12, at 16 (detailing the story of a nine year-old soccer player who
was allowed to play with a walker "because the league preferred to avoid the cost and
trouble of litigation").
181. In Doe v. Eagle-Union Community School Corp., a disabled high school athlete
suffering from psychological disorders sued the school district under the Rehabilitation
Act because the basketball coach cut him from the team. 101 F. Supp. 2d 707,714-15,718
(S.D. Ind. 2000), vacated as moot, No. 00-2122,00-2690,2001 WL 246014, at *1-2 (7th Cir.
2001). Although the coach had knowledge of the student's disability and encouraged the
student to try out for the team, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district because the plaintiff did not present any evidence of a causal connection between
the plaintiff's disability and his failure to make the team. Id. at 719-20. According to the
court, the coach gave every student the same opportunity to try out and made his decisions
"consistent with his past knowledge and experience in coaching basketball." Id. at 719.
Although Eagle-Union involved a Rehabilitation Act claim prior to the Supreme
Court's resolution of Martin, the case may be indicative of how many school districts may
choose to respond to open try out requests by disabled athletes. Schools may allow the
disabled athlete to tryout against able-bodied competitors and then opt not to select them
for objective and athletic-related reasons. From the school's perspective, this policy would
likely prevent a suit much like Martin, in which the athlete sues immediately after the
athletic organization denies the athlete's requested accommodation or the opportunity to
participate altogether. From the athlete's perspective, the open tryout gives him the
opportunity to prove that he can compete with other able-bodied competitors.
182. For example, the United States Youth Soccer Association has over six thousand
individual clubs and leagues in over fifty-five different state associations. US YOUTH
SOCCER, Mission and History, at http:Ilwww.usysa.orgloffice/rission.cfm (last visited Oct.
26, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). By comparison, Little League
Baseball has over seven thousand individual leagues in more than one hundred countries.
Structure of Little League Basebal4 Inc., at http://www.littleleague.orglabout/structure.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
183. The resiliency of Casey Martin and Ford Olinger should stand our as a potential
warning sign to any athletic organization thinking that protracted litigation will be an
avenue to resolution. Each of these men have pursued their claims for several years and
never gave an indication that they would stop before a final resolution. See Richards,
supra note 32 (stating that Olinger intends to pursue his claim in light of the Supreme
Court's resolution of Martin). If Martin's and Olinger's experiences are representative of
disabled athletes as a whole, then athletic organizations can expect a prolonged fight to
exclude members of this class.
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In the end, the issue of inclusion largely comes down to a policy
choice on behalf of sports organizations. On one hand, they can
devote their resources toward exclusion-hiring lawyers, engaging in
litigation, and creating policies designed to keep athletes off the
playing field. On the other hand, these entities can devote these same
resources toward the very purpose of the ADA, namely inclusion and
"the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. '' "8
In short, the Court's holding that Title III applies to the PGA
Tour and other similarly situated athletic entities has the potential to
provide a very powerful weapon for disabled athletes seeking
accommodations under the ADA. Although all athletic organizations
conducting some degree of open public competition at places of
public accommodation will likely be subject to the mandates of Title
III, it does not follow that a rush of suits by disabled athletes will soon
flood the federal court system. Expansive litigation is unlikely, not
only because the prospect of litigation may force accommodation, but
also because disabled athletes seeking assistance under Title III still
must establish an accommodation that is both necessary and
reasonable.
B. Is a Disabled Athlete's Requested Accommodation Reasonable
and Necessary?
In order to receive relief under Title III of the ADA, a disabled
athlete must establish that the requested accommodation is a
reasonable modification in a policy, practice, or procedure of the
place of public accommodation.185 Courts have interpreted the
"reasonable" language to mean that the accommodation must be
"reasonable in a general sense, that is, reasonable in the run of
cases."186 An accommodation is not reasonable if the place of public
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).
185. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
186. Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997).
When conducting the reasonable accommodation analysis, courts must pay close attention
to the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,
157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Whether a particular accommodation is reasonable
depends on the circumstances of the individual case."), amended by 196 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. granted by 121 S. Ct. 1600 (2001); see supra note 103 and accompanying text.
In short, "[r]easonableness is not a constant." Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976
F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that what may be reasonable in one context may not
be reasonable in another, even if the differences between the two are relatively slight).
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accommodation incurs an undue financial or administrative burden.'8
Additionally, the ADA specifically exempts all accommodations that
"pose a direct threat to the health and safety of others" as
unreasonable.198
In Martin and Olinger, each respective court concluded that the
requested use of a golf cart was reasonable in the general sense.1 89
Although the PGA Tour did not raise this issue before the Supreme
Court,' g° the Ninth Circuit justified its holding on the grounds that
golf carts are permitted in other types of PGA Tour competitions 91
and do not present either logistical or practical difficulties on golf
courses.
192
187. E.g., Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1031 (6th Cir.
1995); Ganden v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 U.S. Dist. WL
6800000, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21,1996).
188. § 12182(b)(3). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that
potential danger posed by the accommodation must be significant. Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998); see 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b) (2000) (stating that a direct threat is a
"significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures").
189. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1893 (2001) (stating that the PGA Tour
did not contest the reasonableness of Casey Martin's requested accommodation); Olinger
v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the
accommodation sought was "reasonable in a general sense"), cert. denied, judgment
vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212,2212 (2001).
190. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1893.
191. Although carts are not normally allowed on the PGA Tour, carts are permitted in
several other PGA Tour sponsored competitions. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1895. The PGA Tour
has allowed golfers to use carts in some of its tournaments if a great distance lies between
holes. Id. at 1885. The PGA Tour allows golfers on the Senior Tour to use carts if they so
desire. Id. at 1895. The Tour justifies this rule by the fact that the golfers are over fifty
years of age. See Curtis Strange, Protecting the Game, GOLF MAGAZINE, March 1998, at
34, available at http://www.golfonline.com/tours/pga/strange/mar98.html (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Additionally, the PGA Tour allows carts in the first two
rounds of the Qualifying School. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1895. The rationale behind this
policy is that a large number of golfers qualify in a short amount of time during the initial
rounds and carts are needed to keep the pace of play moving forward. See Strange, supra.
The PGA Tour also permits carts in the weekly "open" qualifying events conducted
before each PGA Tour Tournament. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1895.
192. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2000), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879
(2001). In Olinger, the district court justified its holding on the grounds that the "Rules of
Golf," promulgated by the USGA, acknowledge the potential involvement of carts in the
game of golf. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 926, 934 (N.D. Ind. 1999),
aff'd Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted,
judgment vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001). In addition, the court noted that
of the thirteen major tournaments conducted by the USGA, two allow competitors to ride
carts during play. Id. Both the U.S. Senior Men's Amateur and the U.S. Senior Women's
Amateur allow carts due to the fact that the events are conducted in the fall when caddies
are in short supply. Id. Unlike the U.S. Open, for which Olinger attempted to qualify,
these two events are not designed to identify the national champion of golf. Thus, the
USGA saw no problem with allowing carts in these lower caliber competitions. Id.
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Although the reasonable accommodation issue did not present a
significant obstacle for either Casey Martin or Ford Olinger, disabled
athletes should recognize that not all accommodations will pass
judicial scrutiny so easily. If a disabled athlete's requested
accommodation imposes an undue financial burden or administrative
burden on the athletic organization, then it will be deemed
unreasonable. 93 In fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit invoked the undue burden reasoning in holding that a
high school athletic association was not required to waive its age limit
rule.194 The court explained that implementing a waiver system for
the age limit would impose an undue burden on the Michigan High
School Athletic Association because schools would have to analyze
individually every student requesting an age waiver and determine
whether the student's age posed an unfair competitive advantage.1 5
The financial or administrative burden limitation has the
potential to impact most significantly disabled athletes seeking
accommodations from recreational and non-profit sports
organizations. Unlike professional sports organizations, recreational
athletic organizations are often non-profit entities formed by a small
number of people or a local community.196 These organizations may
not have either the administrative resources or the financial capital to
accommodate a request made by a disabled athlete.' 97
193. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
194. Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir.
1995).
195. Id.
196. A perfect example of this phenomenon is the proliferation of youth soccer
organizations over the past twenty years. See U.S. YouTH SOCCER, Mission and History,
at http://usysa.orgloffice/mission.cfm (stating that the United States has over 6,000 local
youth leagues and clubs) (last visited Nov. 27, 2001) (on file with North Carolina Law
Review). Virtually all of these organizations are formed at the local level by parents and
players who attempt to achieve both social interaction and community involvement. See
Statement of Virgil I. Lewis II, U.S. Youth Soccer Chairman, at http://wwv.puaf.umd.edu/
Affiliates/CivicRenewal/usyouth.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2001) (on file with North
Carolina Law Review). In fact, youth soccer has been one of the most progressive
organizations with respect to accommodating disabled athletes though the use of its
TOPSoccer Program. UNIROYAL TIRE TOPSOCCER, at http://usysa.org/field/tsoccer.cfm
(last visited Nov. 27,2001) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
197. The Sixth Circuit's holding in Sandison stands out as a particularly noteworthy
limitation in this area because the court held that evaluating every student's request for a
waiver of an athletic rule would constitute an undue burden. Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1035.
Similarly, in Olinger, the Seventh Circuit held that the administrative burden on the
USGA of distinguishing between those golfers who truly need a cart to compete and those
who do not would be too great. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1007,
(7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 121 S.Ct. 2212 (2001). In
deciding whether an individual poses a direct threat, "public accommodations must make
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The "direct threat" limitation also has the potential to pose a
significant barrier to disabled athletes seeking modifications to the
rules of competitive sports.198 Although the direct threat limitation
primarily has been used to shield athletic entities covered by the
ADA from making accommodations for individuals with contagious
diseases,199 it has the potential to apply to requests for rule
modifications within competitive athletics as well. For example,
wheelchair basketball players will not soon be found in the NBA as
they would likely pose a significant health risk to the able-bodied
competitors. Because many modifications to the substantive rules of
sport have the potential to subject other participants to some danger,
disabled athletes have limited options with respect to their requested
accommodations.2 0
Beyond the general reasonableness of the requested
accommodation, a disabled athlete must also establish that the
modification is necessary for his participation.2 1 On balance, this
requirement will not impose a significant obstacle for many disabled
athletes, whose participation would be impossible absent the
an individual assessment to determine: (1) the nature, duration, and severity of the risk;
(2) the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; (3) and whether reasonable
modifications or policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk." 28 C.F.R. § 36-
208(c) (2001).
198. The direct threat limitation is based upon the idea that individuals with disabilities
should not be discriminated against, yet accommodations for these individuals should not
significantly jeopardize the health and safety of others. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 649 (1998); Sch. Bd. of Nassau County. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1979).
199. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 213 F.3d 921, 924-26 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a high
school violated neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act when it placed a basketball
player with hemophilia on "hold" status after the school had concerns for the health and
safety of other athletes); Montalvo v. Radcliffe, 167 F.3d 873, 879 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the exclusion of an HIV-infected twelve year old child from martial arts did not
violate the ADA because the child's participation would constitute a "direct threat" to the
health and safety of other participants and the risk could not be eliminated by way of a
reasonable accommodation).
200. At least one court has addressed the direct threat issue within the context of rule
modification. In Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., a coach confined to a
wheelchair sued under the ADA in order to enjoin the enforcement of a new rule
prohibiting wheelchairs on the field. 794 F. Supp. 342, 343-44 (D. Ariz. 1992). The court
rejected the Little League's defense that wheelchairs on the field posed a direct threat to
the playing participants largely because the coach had been on the field for the last three
years without incident. Id. at 343, 345. Although Anderson received his accommodation,
one is left to wonder whether the same result would occur if the situation involved a player
requesting to use a wheelchair within the field of play as opposed to a coach who is outside
this boundary.
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
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requested accommodation?2 Nevertheless, the individual situations
of both Casey Martin and Ford Olinger raise some interesting issues
with respect to whether an accommodation is necessary for a disabled
athlete. Both men can walk, albeit with pain and substantial
difficulty.230  Although both the Ninth and Seventh Circuits
recognized that walking a full eighteen holes was nearly impossible
for both men, and held a cart to be a necessary accommodation,
neither court discussed the exact meaning of a "necessary"
accommodation for purposes of Title 1I0?4
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify this issue in Martin, but
left a significant question open for discussion. In stating that Casey
Martin's request for a golf cart was a necessary accommodation, the
Court added crucial dicta that limits the potential impact Martin will
have on other athletes seeking accommodations: "Martin's claim thus
differs from one that might be asserted by players with less serious
afflictions that make walking the course uncomfortable or difficult,
but not beyond their capacity. In such cases, an accommodation
might be reasonable but not necessary."2 5 The Court, however, did
not define what it meant by a "necessary" accommodation within the
context of athletics. Therefore, the Martin decision left unresolved
the question of the degree of necessity at which an athlete's requested
modification becomes indispensable.
Clearly, the Court did not intend for "necessary" to mean that
athletes must have an absolute physical inability because Casey
Martin would not have prevailed as he can walk to some degree. °
Given this inference, the level of disability needed for an
accommodation to rise to an athletic necessity is something more than
"uncomfortable or difficult, but not beyond [one's] capacity,' 20 7 yet
less than absolute physical inability
202. For instance, all modifications involving disabled athletes suing amateur athletic
organizations for a waiver of an age rule must be "necessary" for purposes of the ADA
because the athlete could not participate unless the organization waives or modifies the
rule.
203. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1885-86 (2001); Olinger, 205 F.3d at
1001; see Charles & Sider, supra note 4, at 48 (quoting Martin as saying that he could walk,
"[i]f you put a gun to my head.").
204. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1893. Although neither the district court nor the Seventh
Circuit discussed the necessity of the cart in Olinger, it must be presumed that such an
accommodation was necessary or else the case would have been decided on this ground.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1885-86.
207. Id at 1893.
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Although the distinction between necessity and convenience
remains ripe for clarification in future cases, °0 the Court's dicta
regarding "less serious afflictions" limits the number of potential
plaintiffs who can bring rule modification claims after Martin. The
Court has crafted an opinion that virtually excludes all disabled
athletes with minor physical ailments. This limiting language means
that accommodation requests from athletes with bad backs or
sprained knees will not overwhelm federal courts because these types
of insignificant ailments only make athletics "uncomfortable or
difficult, but not beyond their capacity. '209  From this perspective,
Martin cannot be viewed as a Pandora's box that will transform all of
competitive athletics into a series of individual rules exceptions.
Instead, the Supreme Court made a well-reasoned decision that
appropriately distinguishes between qualified disabled athletes who
genuinely need an accommodation in order to compete and those
athletes who do not.
210
For the disabled athletes that establish both a reasonable and
necessary accommodation, a final inquiry awaits: Does the requested
accommodation fundamentally alter the nature of the place of public
accommodation? 211  Within the field of athletics, courts considering
this question have reached inconsistent results.1 2 In fact, the
208. The recent story of South African swimmer Terence Parkin illustrates a perfect
test case for determining whether an accommodation is truly necessary. Parkin is a deaf
swimmer who won the silver medal in the 200 meter breaststroke at the 2000 Sydney
Olympics. Ron Sutton, Parkin Turns Deaf Ear to Handicap, at http://www.teleport.com/
-kford/webwatch/0066.html (Sept. 21, 2000) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). As a result of this hearing impairment, Parkin used a strobe light rather than an
air horn to signal him to begin the race. Id. Parkin could have used hearing aids and been
signaled via a horn like the rest of the competitors, but opted for the visual signal after the
sounds picked up by the hearing aids made him nervous and less focused before the race.
Id. The first issue raised by this accommodation is whether it is truly necessary.
Specifically, if Parkin can use his hearing aids, why should he be allowed to use a strobe
light simply because it makes him more comfortable? Secondly, because light travels
faster than the speed of sound, does this starting device give Parkin a competitive
advantage in the sport of swimming where first and second place are often separated by
hundredths of a second? Id.
209. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1893.
210. Id. (stating that "Martin's claim thus differs from one that might be asserted by
players with less serious afflictions that make walking difficult, but not beyond their
capacity").
211. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). Unlike the previous inquiries under Title
III, the burden of proof for the fundamentally alter question rests with the place of public
accommodation. E.g., Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059
(5th Cir. 1997); Lieber v. Macy's West, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1065,1077 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
212. Compare, e.g., Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930
(8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a waiver of the MHSAA's age limit for high school athletes
would constitute a fundamental alteration of the state's baseball program), with
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fundamental alteration issue was the central difference between the
Martin and Olinger decisions at the appellate level 13 Before
proceeding to the Supreme Court's resolution of this dispute,
however, a brief review of the relevant law addressing this question
within the field of competitive athletics is necessary.
C. Does a Requested Accommodation Fundamentally Alter the
Nature of Competitive Athletics?
The U.S. Supreme Court first developed the fundamentally alter
concept in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.2 1 4 Although
this case involved a plaintiff suing under the Rehabilitation Act, the
Court's reasoning applies equally to the ADA due to the statutory
and regulatory provisions calling for both laws to be read in concert
with one another."5 In Davis, the Court held that a hearing-impaired
nursing student's request to modify portions of the curriculum to
accommodate her disability would result in a fundamental alteration
of the basic courses that one must pass in order to become a
practicing nurse.216 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned
that the law does not mandate such curriculum modifications when
the outcome would result in a significant educational disparity
between the disabled individual and the remaining nurses who
comply with all the requisite courses.217 Although the Court did not
articulate any criteria to serve as guidelines for what constitutes a
fundamental alteration, the Davis decision illustrates the Supreme
Court's reluctance to construe the fundamentally alter concept as a
vehicle to place disabled individuals who cannot comply with a set of
material provisions on the same footing as those who can.218
Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 852 (7th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a modification of the IHSAA's age requirement would not fundamentally
alter the nature of competitive high school basketball).
213. Compare Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 999-1002 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a golf cart does not fundamentally alter the nature of competitive golf), aff'd,
121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001), with Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001, 1005-07
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a golf cart fundamentally alters the nature of competitive
golf), cert. denied, judgment vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
214. 442 U.S. 397 (1978).
215. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text; see also Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't
of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts have the ability to refer to
decisions interpreting the Rehabilitation Act in order to find the meaning of terms used in
the ADA).
216. See Southeastern Cmty. Coll., 442 U.S. at 407, 409 (stating that the nurse wanted
individual instruction as well as a waiver of certain academic courses).
217. See id.
218. See id. at 409-10 (stating that the plaintiffs requested modifications would not
allow her to receive "even a rough equivalent of the training a nursing program normally
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As a result of the Supreme Court's lack of guidance regarding
the specific evidence necessary to establish a fundamental alteration
to a place of public accommodation, lower courts have generally
focused on the disabled individual's particular circumstances instead
of the general nature of the requested accommodation.2 19 Within the
field of athletics, this individualized focus has led to inconsistent
results. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a modification of the Indiana High School
Athletic Association's age requirement would not fundamentally
alter the nature of competitive high school basketball.20 In contrast,
several courts hearing claims from learning disabled high school
athletes have held that a modification or waiver of the eligibility
requirements for student-athletes would fundamentally alter the
nature of sports programs. 1  Similarly, college athletes suing the
NCAA for modifications of its eligibility requirements have rarely
succeeded.'
What separates the high school athletic association and NCAA
cases from both Martin and Olinger is the type of accommodation
being requested. In the former cases, the disabled athletes were
seeking either a waiver or a modification of a rule that would grant
them access to the playing field. Conversely, Casey Martin and Ford
gives," thus such modifications would constitute a "fundamental alteration in the nature of
[the] program").
219. E.g., Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059-60 (5th Cir.
1997) (stating that the focus of the inquiry should be on the plaintiff's or defendant's
individual circumstances); Stillwell v. Kansas City, Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 872 F.
Supp. 682,687 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (stating that the ADA requires a case-by-case analysis of
the disabled individual and the benefits that he or she seeks).
220. Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 852 (7th Cir.
1999).
221. McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 462 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a waiver of the age restriction would fundamentally alter the nature of high
school athletics because it would allow older and more physically aggressive students to
compete against younger less developed athletes); Sandison v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that a waiver of an age requirement for
high school athletes would fundamentally alter the nature of competition because it would
inject older and generally more physically mature students into athletic programs);
Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that a waiver of the MHSAA's age limit for high school athletes would constitute a
fundamental alteration in nature of the state's baseball program).
222. Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459, 466-67 (D.N.J. 1997) (denying a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that a complete abandonment of the NCAA's core course
requirement would constitute a fundamental alteration of the NCAA's eligibility
requirements); Ganden v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Inc., No. 96 C 6953, 1996 U.S.
Dist. WL 680000, at *15-16 (N.D. IIl. Nov. 21,1996) (holding that a waiver or modification
of the NCAA's minimum GPA requirement would fundamentally alter the NCAA's
eligibility procedures).
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Olinger were asking for an accommodation that changed a
substantive rule of sport inside the field of play.' Due in large part
to this unique request, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits reached
differing results with respect to the issue of whether a golf cart would
fundamentally alter the nature of competitive golf.224  This
disagreement forced the Supreme Court to address this issue directly
in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.
At the outset, the Court envisioned that a modification of the
rules of the PGA Tour's tournaments might work a fundamental
alteration in two possible ways. 2 6 First, a modification might change
an essential aspect of the game of golf such that the alteration would
be unacceptable even if it impacted all of the competitors equally. 7
Second, a modification may have a less noticeable impact on the sport
as a whole, but may fundamentally alter the sport by giving a disabled
player a competitive advantage over the other tournament
participants.' With respect to Casey Martin's request for a waiver of
the PGA Tour's walking rule, the Court held that such a waiver
would not constitute a fundamental alteration in either sense.22
9
In order to reach this conclusion, the Court noted that the use of
carts was not at odds with the basic character of golf." Put simply,
the basic elements of the game are to hit the ball in the hole in the
least number of strokesP 1  Furthermore, walking can hardly be
fundamental when the "Rules of Golf" only mention it as an optional
223. Prior to Martin, only one other court had the opportunity to address whether an
alteration of a rule inside the field of play constituted a fundamental alteration for the
purposes of the ADA. In Elitt v. USA Hockey, the parents of a youth hockey player with
Attention Deficit Disorder brought an action under the ADA requesting that the hockey
league allow the child's father or brother to be on the ice during practices and games. 922
F. Supp. 217, 218 (E.D. Mo. 1996). According to the court, this accommodation would
constitute a fundamental alteration because the presence of family members on the ice
"would disrupt the flow of play and prevent players from experiencing conditions of a
regular scrimmage." Id. at 225. Alternatively, the parents requested that their child be
permitted to "play down" in a younger age group because of his disabled condition. Id. at
218. Again, the court held that this would be a fundamental alteration of the hockey
program because the child had attention problems and was larger than the other players in
the "squirt" level. Id. at 225. Accordingly, the child's presence would increase the chance
of injury and disrupt the overall nature of the hockey program at that level. Id.
224. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
225. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
226. Id. at 1893. For example, the court hypothesized that enlarging the golf hole







rule in the appendix. 2 Indeed, the PGA Tour admitted as much
because it permitted golfers to ride carts in several of its
tournaments. 3
The Court also rejected the PGA Tour's argument that the
walking rule was an "outcome-affecting" one, a waiver of which
would most certainly rise to a fundamental alteration.234 First, the
Court stated that many other factors, such as weather and luck, have
as much potential to impact the outcome of a golf tournament as
fatigue from walking.25 Second, the factual evidence in the district
court's record disclosed that the fatigue endured from walking a golf
course is not significant. 23 6 Third, the Court noted that even if a cart
was available in tournament competition, many able-bodied golfers
would not choose to ride one.
27
Finally, and most importantly, the Court stated that
consideration of Casey Martin's individual circumstances led to the
conclusion that waiving the cart rule would not fundamentally alter
the nature of competitive golf. 3s  Because walking is largely
tangential to the game of golf, the rule can be modified in individual
232. Il at 1894-95.
233. Id at 1895; see supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
234. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1895.
235. Id
236. Id During the district court proceeding, Dr. Gary Klug, an exercise physiologist,
testified that the average person expends about five hundred calories when walking a golf
course. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Or. 1998), affd, 204 F.3d
994 (2000), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001). According to his testimony, this figure basically
amounts to the nutritional equivalent of a Big Mac. Id Due to the fact that fatigue is
caused by stress, psychological phenomenon, and a loss of fluids, rather than expenditure
of energy, the court concluded that the simple act of walking a golf course cannot be
deemed significant under normal circumstances. Id. at 1250-51. Interestingly, the Olinger
court excluded Dr. Klug's testimony from the record due to the fact that the methodology
used to formulate these conclusions was never disclosed. Olinger v. United States Golf
Ass'n, 52 F. Supp. 2d 947, 950 (N.D. Ind. 1999), affd 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 121 S. Ct. 2212 (2001).
237. Martin, 121 S. CL at 1896. For example, in a single tournament where one shot
can be the deciding factor in who wins and loses, knowledge of the greens, rough, and
general course conditions are essential to a championship caliber performance. The golfer
who speeds along quickly in a cart does not get to experience the course's texture and the
subtle traps that could be lurking beneath the surface. In contrast, the golfer who takes
the time to walk can physically feel as well as observe the course from a closer perspective
and arguably has a better knowledge of the course as a whole. Even assuming that
walking may induce a mild fatigue factor, the overall strategic advantage gained by
walking would seem to outweigh the energy one saves by riding. See Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1251 n.13 (D. Or. 1998) (referring to the testimony of current
Buy.com professional Eric Johnson who described the comparative advantage of walking
over riding a cart), affd, 204 F.3d 994 (2000), affd, 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
238. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896.
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cases without causing a fundamental alteration. 9 With respect to
Martin's individual circumstances, the factual record illustrated that
he easily suffered more fatigue with a cart than the other competitors
who walk the course.240 Accordingly, providing Martin with a cart
would not compromise the PGA Tour's walking rule, which was
designed to inject an element of fatigue into the game.241 In sum, "[a]
modification... to a peripheral tournament rule without impairing its
purpose cannot be said to .'fundamentally alter' the [sport]." 242
Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court's analysis of the
fundamental alteration issue strikes the appropriate balance between
maintaining the integrity of competitive sports and accommodating
qualified disabled athletes. The most common criticism of the Martin
decision is that it will create an avalanche of litigation in which the
rules of competitive sport will be whittled down to a series of
individualized exceptions.243  Despite these often dire predictions,
careful consideration of the Court's analysis reveals that these
forecasts will not come to fruition.
First, by holding that modifications to the rules of sport can work
two types of fundamental alterations, the Court recognized that
certain types of athletic rules simply cannot be altered, regardless of
the circumstances of the disabled individual seeking the
accommodation.2" Moreover, some rules are simply so integral to
athletics that a per se modification of them would constitute a
fundamental alteration.245 In Martin, the PGA Tour's walking rule
was held to be a "peripheral" rule that could be waived without
changing the foundation of the sport of golf. The same cannot be said
for all rules in all sports. For example, the sport of soccer is premised
on the rule that field players cannot use their hands to advance the
ball. Under the Court's analytical framework, a modification of this
rule would most certainly rise to a fundamental alteration because
239. Id. Conversely, the waiver of an essential rule would certainly cause a
fundamental alteration. Id
240. Id. at 1897.
241. Id
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1904 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (imagining that a Little League player would
request a court for four strikes at bat instead of three); see supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
245. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896 (stating that a waiver of an essential rule of competition
would work a fundamental alteration); see id at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that at
some point, modification in the rules of sport change the game in such a way that it is no
longer the same game).
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such a change would alter "an essential aspect of the game."" Even
though drawing the line between peripheral rules and essential rules
may involve a highly fact-specific inquiry,247 the Court recognized that
such a line does, in fact, exist. As a result of this recognition, the
foundational rules of sport that form the bedrock of athletics will be
immune from modification. 248 Conversely, those rules that
tangentally relate to the game will be the only ones subject to
alteration.24 9 Given this critical distinction, the critics who say that
Martin is just a first step toward stilts in the NBA or jet-propelled
javelins are way off base 0
Second, the Supreme Court's focus on Casey Martin's individual
circumstances ensures that future courts will give adequate
consideration to the unique situations of disabled athletes."1 At the
same time, the consideration of a disabled athlete's personal
circumstances has a limiting effect because the reviewing court can
also consider how the modification will impact athletic competition as
a whole. 2 The result of this dual function is that the Court's
analytical framework permits accommodations for qualified disabled
246. Id. at 1893.
247. This inference is clearly justified by the Court's consideration of the PGA Tour's
walking rule. Id. at 1893-98. At least one commentator has proposed an analytical
framework in order to determine which rules of sports are essential. Waterstone, supra
note 30, at 1535-39 (proposing a seven-question test to analyze rule modifications).
248. For instance, the following could be considered foundational rules: dribbling in
basketball, skating in hockey, and running the bases in baseball.
249. An example of a tangential rule would be major league baseball's so-called
"motionless" rule. Once a pitcher steps on the pitching rubber, he is required to stand
completely still until he begins his delivery. Waterstone, supra note 30, at 1536. This rule
created a problem for Jim Abbott, a one-armed pitcher, who could not comply with this
mandate given his physical limitations. Id. Nevertheless, Major League Baseball granted
Abbott an exception from this rule. ld.
250. See supra note 19-21 and accompanying text.
251. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1896-97 (discussing Martin's individual circumstances). The
Court's decision to focus on an athlete's individual circumstances is buttressed by an
earlier athletic accommodation case. In Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., a child
with cerebral palsy attempted to play youth baseball with crutches in a division reserved
for younger players. 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1223-24 (C.D. Cal. 1996). The league refused this
request and the child's parents brought an action under the ADA to compel the league to
adhere to this accommodation. Id. at 1224. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of the parents because the league failed to examine the particulars of the child's condition
when it made its decision to deny the requested accommodation. Id. at 1225-26.
Moreover, the league based its decision on "assumed and unsubstantiated concerns of a
possible risk of harm to Plaintiff and other players, and insurance ramifications." Id. at
1225. The court went on to hold that the league violated the ADA because it did not
make any effort to find out about the child's "individual needs" or consider whether the
child could in fact run or engage in athletic activity. Id. at 1225-26.
252. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897 (stating that granting Martin an accommodation did not
give him a competitive advantage).
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athletes while simultaneously limiting these accommodations only to
those situations in which competition will not be adversely affected.
In addition to crafting an opinion that protects the integrity of
competitive athletics, the Court's focus on Casey Martin's individual
situation has the broader effect of resolving the disagreement
between the circuits as to how they should approach an ADA claim
by a disabled athlete. In considering Martin's claim, the Supreme
Court reiterated the position that the purpose and language of the
ADA require a personal inquiry into both the reasonableness of the
requested accommodation and the fundamental alteration issue3
3
This affirmation was crucial because one of the key differences
between the Ninth Circuit's Martin opinion and the Seventh Circuit's
Olinger opinion was the way in which the courts approached the
fundamental alteration analysis. More specifically, the Ninth Circuit
centered its analysis on the individualized nature of Casey Martin's
condition, whereas the Seventh Circuit looked at the more general
issue of whether carts altered the nature of competitive golf.2 The
Supreme Court's emphasis on Martin's personal circumstances
clarifies any discrepancy between the courts by sending the message
that due consideration must be paid to a disabled athlete's individual
features. In sum, this holding, consistent with both the purpose and
language of the ADA,' guarantees that disabled athletes seeking
modifications to the rules of competitive athletics will have their cases
decided by courts assessing their individual circumstances rather than
the general issue of whether the accommodation fundamentally alters
the nature of the sport.
At the same time, however, this individualized analysis correctly
limits the breadth of the Martin decision to only those situations in
which an accommodation will not disrupt the competitive balance of
the sport in question. As illustrated by Martin, the Court considered
the impact that a waiver of the PGA Tour's walking rule would have
on the competition level in its tournaments. Because Martin "easily
endures greater fatigue even with a cart than his able-bodied
competitors do by walking," a waiver of the walking rule would
neither compromise the competitive balance of the PGA Tour nor
253. Id at 1896.
254. Compare Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000), with
Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001,1007 (7th Cir. 2000).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994) (stating that the ADA was enacted to eliminate
discrimination against individuals with disabilities) (emphasis added); see supra notes 103,




the fatigue-related purpose behind the walking rule. 6 Nonetheless,
several reasons suggest that not all future cases will necessarily
proceed along these precise lines.
First, the logical corollary of the Court's analytical framework in
Martin is that a waiver of an athletic rule that gives a player a
competitive advantage will likely constitute a fundamental
alteration.257  Therefore, any rule modification that would give a
disabled athlete even the slightest competitive advantage over the
able-bodied participants would risk being labeled a fundamental
alteration 58 Importantly, this limitation ensures that the competitive
nature of athletic competition will not be compromised by future
ADA claims. The Court correctly drew the line between rule
modifications that provide access and those that provide a
competitive advantage. Because the Court appears unwilling to
permit accommodations that tread into the latter of these two
categories, the integrity of competitive athletics will not be
compromised by the Martin holding.
Second, the requested rule modification cannot jeopardize the
underlying purpose of the rule. Because Casey Martin's fatigue with
a cart outweighed the fatigue of able-bodied walkers, a waiver of the
walking rule did not rise to the level of a fundamental alteration 9
Despite Martin's success on this issue, future plaintiffs may have
difficulty with this inquiry because modifications to many athletic
rules will likely compromise the purposes behind these rules.26  In
Martin's case, the Court held that such a compromise did not occur
256. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897.
257. See id at 1893 (stating that a modification in rule of sport may give a player an
advantage in competition and thus fundamentally alter the nature of the sport).
258. This inference is consistent with the underlying purpose of the ADA because
Congress intended the Act to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals, not
provide advantages to them. See § 12101(b).
259. Martin, 121 S. Ct. at 1897.
260. A simple hypothetical may help to illustrate this point. For example, the purpose
behind the rule of running the bases in baseball is to inject the elements of speed and
agility into the game. A request by a disabled athlete for a waiver or modification of this
rule would arguably compromise this underlying purpose; that is, a waiver would remove
these elements from the game as it is played by the disabled athlete. Under the analytical
framework adopted in Martin, this type of rule modification would constitute a
fundamental alteration unless the athlete could somehow show, as Casey Martin did, that
a waiver would neither compromise the rule's purpose nor give the athlete a competitive
advantage. See id. at 1896-97. Although future cases will undoubtedly be needed to
determine how courts will interpret this portion of the Martin holding, one forecast
appears likely: rarely will a situation like Martin's occur in which an athlete obtains a
waiver or modification of a substantive athletic rule without compromising the
fundamental purpose behind the rule.
2002] 689
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because Martin's physical condition injected the element of fatigue
into the sport, thus eliminating the necessity of the walking rule.261
Given this holding, future disabled athletes will need to demonstrate
both that their conditions correlate to the purpose behind the rule,
and rise to such a level that a waiver of the rule will not compromise
its purpose or give the athlete an advantage. This rather strict set of
criteria has the potential to provide disabled athletes with
modifications to the substantive rules of athletics; however, this
restriction also serves to limit modifications to only those rules whose
purposes will not be compromised. 62 Such a balance adequately
addresses both the dual concerns of accommodation and the integrity
of competitive athletics.
CONCLUSION
The ADA has reconfigured the landscape of America for
disabled individuals over the course of the last decade. It has
modified the "rules" of employment, government programs, and
places of public accommodation in order to provide access and
opportunity to disabled members of society. PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Martin2 63 represents an important step forward in this social
progression by treating the rules of competitive athletics no
differently than any other barrier that prevents disabled citizens from
enjoying full participation in society.
264
Too often disabled citizens are viewed as being merely "human
interest" stories that should inspire the rest of the able-bodied world.
Casey Martin is not a human interest story, he is a sports story. More
specifically, he is an athlete with tremendous talents that faces
unfortunate barriers to realizing his professional dreams. The United
States Supreme Court correctly recognized that granting Martin a golf
cart would not fundamentally alter tournament golf. Moreover, such
261. See id.
262. Because Casey Martin endures more fatigue with a cart than his able-bodied
competitors, the purpose of the walking rule was not compromised by allowing Martin to
ride a cart. Id. at 1897. Accordingly, the Court held that the modification of such a
peripheral rule would not constitute a "fundamental alteration." Id. The logical corollary
to the Court's reasoning is that a modification that does in fact compromise a rule's
underlying purpose will rise to the level of a fundamental alteration for the purposes of
the ADA.
263. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
264. Schultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (quoting Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D. Az.
1992)) ("It is imperative that Americans with disabilities be brought fully into the




an accommodation was both reasonable and necessary in order for
him to pursue his dream of playing golf alongside the world's greatest
players.
At the same time, however, the Court's opinion, as well as
preexisting limitations of the ADA, prevent the likelih6od that
Martin will lead to a litigation boom that transforms the rules of
competitive athletics into a series of individualized exceptions. First,
many athletes will have difficulty establishing a recognized
"disability" under the ADA, either because the ailment may not
impact a major life activity or because it may only be a temporary
condition. Second, not all accommodations will be both reasonable
and necessary. Third, as the Supreme Court recognized in Martin,
some rules may be essential to the sport in question and therefore
may never be modified or altered. Finally, modifications can neither
provide a disabled athlete with a competitive advantage, nor
compromise the purpose of an athletic rule.
In the end, Martin strikes the appropriate balance between
accommodating qualified disabled athletes and maintaining the
integrity of competitive athletics. If sports are indeed an accurate
reflection of society, then Martin represents a significant
advancement towards a tangible illustration of this ideal through the
Supreme Court's recognition that the athletic playing field should be
accessible to all athletes, whether able-bodied or disabled. At the
same time, the Court correctly recognized the prominent place that
athletics occupy in the American social fabric and crafted an
analytical framework that will ensure the integrity of competitive
sports for years to come.
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